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RESUMO
Esta tese busca analisar como a heterogeneidade de demanda, aqui representada por
comportamento bandwagon e desigualdade de riqueza, molda o processo de decisa˜o da
firma sobre qual tipo de inovac¸a˜o visar, dados os padro˜es de mercado emergentes dessas
caracter´ısticas microeconoˆmicas em ummundo no qual os consumidores sa˜o heterogeˆneos
e interagem entre si. Dois Modelos Baseados em Agentes sa˜o desenvolvidos com o ob-
jetivo de analisar esse assunto que, ale´m de complexo, ainda esta´ para ser analisado
na literatura econoˆmica: enquanto existem diversos estudos sobre difusa˜o de inovac¸a˜o,
nenhum ate´ o momento se aprofunda nos mecanismos micro-mezzo-macro atrave´s dos
quais a interac¸a˜o entre os agentes afetam a estrutura do mercado, o que faz com que
as firmas mudem suas estrate´gias de inovac¸a˜o, gerando diferentes resultados macroe-
conoˆmicos. Uma nova estrutura para interac¸a˜o entre agentes e´ introduzida na qual os
consumidores na˜o sa˜o apenas no´dulos esta´ticos com redes sociais pre´-estabelecidas -
como nos ambientes small world - mas caminham livremente atrave´s do plano da econo-
mia estocasticamente gerando, a cada ponto no tempo, novos processos de interac¸a˜o com
outros agentes, desde que os mesmos estejam no awareness radius dos consumidores,
uma medida criada com o objetivo de controlar a racionalidade e a capacidade de per-
cepc¸a˜o dos agentes. A heterogeneidade no primeiro modelo adve´m das prefereˆncias do
consumidor com relac¸a˜o a` adoc¸a˜o de novas tecnologias, das quais thresholds estoca´sticos
sa˜o derivados, enquanto que no segundo modelo os consumidores possuem diferentes
dotac¸o˜es de riqueza, o que faz com que os mesmos se comportem de maneira diferente
quando avaliam a compra de um novo produto de alta tecnologia e prec¸o. Os resultados
do primeiro modelo mostram que um aumento na capacidade de percepc¸a˜o dos consu-
midores e em suas propenso˜es a serem influenciados por outros consumidores detentores
de produtos de melhor qualidade aceleram a saturac¸a˜o ao longo do ciclo de vida do
produto, levando as firmas a preferir inovac¸o˜es de produto a inovac¸o˜es de processo, o
que gera maiores custos, mark-ups e lucratividade. Apesar da existeˆncia teo´rica de que
exista uma ambiguidade nos efeitos da desigualdade sobre inovac¸o˜es, o segundo modelo
sugere que uma sociedade mais igualita´ria eleva ambos os tipos de inovac¸a˜o, ale´m de le-
var o mercado a ser mais competitivo e apresentar menores prec¸os, mark-ups e margens
de lucro.
Palavras-chave: Inovac¸a˜o. Comportamento Bandwagon. Saturac¸a˜o de Demanda.
Ciclo de Vida do Produto. Complexidade.
xi
ABSTRACT
This dissertation seeks to address the issue of how demand heterogeneity, represen-
ted here by bandwagon behaviour and wealth inequality, shapes firm decision on the
type of innovation to pursue, given the emergent market patterns from microeconomic
traits of a world with heterogeneous interacting consumers. Two agent-based models
are develop in order to tackle such complex subject yet to be explored in the litera-
ture: while there are several studies on innovation di↵usion, none so far have explicitly
analysed the micro-mezzo-macro mechanisms through which consumer interaction and
heterogeneity alter market structure, thus changing firms decision on innovation which
generates di↵erent macroeconomic outcomes. A new framework for agent interaction is
introduced in which consumers are not static nodes with pre-set social networks, such
as in small worlds environments, but freely walk through an economic plain stochasti-
cally creating new interaction processes at each point in time with other agents inside
their awareness radius, a measure created to control rationality and perception. Hete-
rogeneity in the first model comes from consumer preferences toward new technologies
from which stochastic threshold values are derived, while in the second consumers have
di↵erent wealth endowments, which makes them behave di↵erently when considering
the purchase of a new costly high-tech product. Results from the first model show that
increasing consumer awareness and making them more adept to be influenced by the
new technologies other consumers own speeds up saturation over the product life cycle,
leading firms to prefer product other than process innovation, which yields higher costs,
mark-up and profitability. Despite the existence of an ambiguous theoretical e↵ect of
inequality over innovation, second model results suggests that a more egalitarian society
drives both product and process innovations up and leads to a more competitive market,
with lower prices mark-ups and profit margins.
Keywords: Innovation. Bandwagon Behaviour. Demand Saturation. Product Life
Cycle. Complexity.
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Cap´ıtulo 1
Introduction
Which came first? Demand or supply? Consumption or production? These questions
are probably more well-known to an economist than the famous egg versus chicken
conundrum. And probably just as hard to answer, or at least to formulate a theory on
the subject that would satisfy economic Greeks and Trojans, keynesians and hayekians.
One can argue that there can be no consumption without a given good to be consumed
and that is certainly correct, but it’s also quite simple to perceive that this given good
does not necessarily need to have been produced by men, or firm.
Let us date back to the stone age, when our ancestors were struggling to find better
ways to defend themselves, to better manipulate objects, to storage food and basically
to survive. There were no firms back then and even so there was consumption; of fruits,
wild animals, water. But with evolution came the needs to new goods. The kind that
could not be found ready in nature, like a sharp stone at the end of a wooden stick, one
of the first goods ever produced and, who knows, maybe even traded for some berries.
In fact, Malthus argues that ”‘the savage would slumber forever under his tree, unless
he were roused from his torpor by the cravings of hunger or the tremblings of cold”1
It is hard to picture a cave man manufacturing something useless and trying to
convince himself or his fellow cave men otherwise. Nevertheless, moving a little further
in time, one can argue that when Colombo discovered America, Indian people had
absolutely no need of a mirror and yet they were willing to trade valuable resources for
it.
Say (2001) state in his famous Say’s Law that the supply always creates its own
demand, which doesn’t seem to hold. About only one percent of the patents registered
in the United States end up as a successful product2. But Ricardo (1817) has a point
when he states “give men but the means of purchase and their wants are insatiable”.
One quick look in any online shopping website and one can find products such as a shirt
with a built-in wi-fi signal detector and a toilet paper that glows in the dark. And be
aware: these are examples of successful patents.
Despite the value or usefulness of a given invention, in the end it cannot escape
Marshall’s Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility3. A person can have an unlimited
1Malthus (1798).
2According to the United States Patent and Trademark O ce.
3Marshall (1890).
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number of wants, but the amount of each want is satiable so there is saturation at
the individual’s level. In other terms, the first slice of pizza is always better and an
individual probably does not need two refrigerators for example.
Resemblant to Marshall’s theory is the Engels Law. More than 150 years a go, Engel
(1857) perceived that the share of food consumption in a consumers basket is decreasing
in income. Several subsequent studies, like Houthakker (1987) obtained not only the
same conclusion but also that most type of products are bound to the same law. If this is
true, Engels law can be viewed of a general law of consumer behaviour: they constantly
change their basket of consumed goods according to their income. This could be viewed
as a Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility from the demand side.
The microeconomics of demand is much more complex and involves a subject that
only recently has been brought back to the economic theory spotlight: the heterogeneity
of consumers and their behaviour, as an alternative to the utility maximizer rational re-
presentative consumer of neoclassical Consumer Theory. It is important to acknowledge,
however, that the study of consumer behaviour need not to be seen as a two-sided quar-
rel between economists who comes from neoclassical and heterodox currents of thought.
In other words, there is no need to separate the great work of Nobel laureates Daniel
Kahneman and Gary Becker into completely di↵erent universes.
It is not the concept of utility or rationality that hinders depth of analysis in indivi-
dual decision, but the limitations of the framework in which it is presented and develo-
ped, where the all seeing economic man reigns sovereign able to perceive everything in
the world around him and to predict future with ease. As Simon (1955) stated, what
traditional theory was in need was “a kind of rational behaviour compatible with the
access of information and computational capacities actually possessed by organisms,
including men”’4
Take for example a high school student. He might decide to start using drugs because
most of his friends - or the group he is interested to be a part of - is doing it; and his
decision can arise both from a desperately irrational need to fit in or a thoughtful
process of pros and cons. In the second case, however, to assume that the student had
all the pay-o↵s associated with possible choices available to him during decision process
is arguably unrealistic. It is a methodological problem between a descriptive and a
normative formulation.
This brings us two important topics that somewhat limit the possibility of an indivi-
dual to behave like a neoclassical economic man: bandwagon behaviour and awareness,
both playing a key role in this thesis. Bandwagon is the willingness of an individual
to buy a product based on how many others have purchased it, while awareness is the
personal bounded rationality each individual has, related to the extent of his social
networks and general understanding of the world around him. These are di cult as-
pects of human behaviour to be formalized in a model for example. Complexity is the
key word here and has long been used by economic authors to justify the negligence
4It is important to stress here that the concept of bounded rationality used further ahead on this
thesis do not mimic those of the life work of specific scholars such as Simon or Sargent, but a more
general one that opposes to global, perfect or neoclassical rationality. See Barros (2010), Sent (1997)
and Sargent (1994) excellent reviews on di↵erent concepts of rationality used in the work of several
researchers.
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towards these subjects. In fact, as brilliantly cited by Leibenstein (1950):
“One reason why the interpersonal e↵ects on demand have been ignored in
current texts may be the fact that Marshall did not consider the matter in
his Principles5. We know, however, from Marshall’s correspondence6, that
he was aware of the problem. Both Cunynghame and Pigou pointed out
that Marshall’s treatment of consumers surplus did not take into account
interpersonal e↵ects on utility. Marshall seemed to feel that this would make
the diagrammatical treatment too complex.”
Leibenstein draws from the work of past economists, psychologists and sociologists
- such as Veblen, Rae and Morgenstern - on fashion and conspicuous consumption to
formalize the concept of bandwagon behaviour, but even himself surrenders to the task
of taking all of its nuances and complexity in consideration, deliberately abstracting
from sociological and psychological elements to focus solely on the e↵ects of conspicuous
consumption on demand functions.
Another subject in need of better micro-foundations is income and wealth inequality.
Driven by the recent increase in American and global income inequality, economists have
renewed their interest in the subject. However, no consensus is found amongst the several
causes proposed to explain the phenomenon and even less about its macroeconomic
impacts7.
While this lack of consensus might exist due to the simple fact that inequality may
have no impact on the macroeconomic variables of common interest such as growth, em-
ployment, poverty, technological change, political outcomes and financial crisis, it might
also be the case that economists have not fully understood exactly how inequality relates
to these other subjects. Mechanisms of transmission from inequality to macroeconomic
variables are still mostly unknown to economic theory due to the lack of understan-
ding on how di↵erent individuals behave according to their social status position in the
relevant population. This is possibly another problem of microeconomic foundations
shortage while trying to tackle an economic problem.
It is safe to assume that researchers in economics have a much higher computational
capability nowadays than they had in the middle of the past century, specially due to the
use of computer simulations. These capabilities, however, have until recently been used
by mainstream economics to answer the wrong questions. Instead of following the lead
of other sciences an diving into the world of complexity, it was mostly used to generalize
the same old neoclassical paradigms with no contribution to the better understanding
and development of microeconomics. Economic theory remained stuck in an equilibrium
state too reductionist to understand the complexity of our modern society.
However, as economic theory was gifted with the work of John Maynard Keynes as
a silver lining of the 1929 great depression, agent-based models started to arise as an
important and modern alternative after 1987 and 2008 financial crisis and were used not
5Marshall (1890).
6Pigou (1903).
7See Moss et al. (2013).
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only to model the interaction between shareholders but to study how all agents in the
economy behave before and during a financial crisis.
Nowadays ABM’s have been growing in popularity and have yielded strong contri-
butions also in the field of innovations8, considered to be one of the main forces driving
economic growth and development. The fact that Robert Sollow TFP9 black box might
not be so black any more has certainly something to do with understanding how the
engine of innovation is greased. One thing that is safe to assume is that innovation is
viewed not only as a simple research & development decision, but a complex process of
integration between supply and demand factors.
It is exactly this complex integration that we seek to better explore in this thesis by
studying how demand heterogeneity in the form of bandwagon behaviour and wealth
inequality shape the market and, consequently, firms decision about process and product
innovation, which upon aggregation, can finally yield us the complete path from micro
through mezzo to macroeconomics. An agent-based model framework seem to be the
right choice for the task.
To connect the links between these three economic levels we draw important insights
from Product Life Cycle Theory, first presented by Kotler (2005). Besides being a
marketing theory largely utilized by most firms to assess and predict di↵usion times
and patterns, it is the only economic life cycle theory to incorporate demand aspects on
innovation di↵usion and firm innovative decisions.
This thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 brings a brief literature review and a
discussion about strategies to model bandwagon behaviour and wealth inequality into
an agent-based environment. Chapter 3 and 4 contains the two agent-based models in
which the goal is to assess how firms shape product and process innovation decisions
based on bandwagon behaviour, in the first model, and wealth inequality in the second.
Finally, chapter 5 brings general conclusions.
8See Dawid (2005) for a survey on Agent-based models of innovation.
9Total Factor Productivity.
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Cap´ıtulo 2
Literature Review and Some New
Insights on Innovation Di↵usion
2.1 Life Cycle Theory
A Life Cycle is not by any margin an exclusive economic phenomena. From natural
to social sciences, from bacteria to sales the majority of growth processes follow the
same pattern of birth, acceleration, dis-acceleration and decline, generating a S-shaped
curve. It is no di↵erent in economic regimes. Using the words of Aoki and Yoshikawa
(2002),“plot a time series of production of any representative product such as steel and
auto-mobiles, or production in any industry, against year, and, with few exceptions, one
obtains an S-shaped curve”(see figure 2.1 below).
Figura 2.1: Demographic Transition and the Impact on Growth: the case of Japan
It is not di cult to understand the mechanism behind a S-shaped curve. In fact the
key words here are also one that motivates economic science: scarcity and saturation. In
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the beginning there are almost no constraints for growth, be it space, food, knowledge,
demand: they are usually abundant at first so the process can grow exponentially with
no boundaries. But when it reaches a certain stage scarcity begins to take its toll
and the agents involved start to feel the lack of resources, preventing them from freely
“reproduce”. The growth then begins to slow down until it reaches a maximum possible
equilibrium (achieves full saturation) or to decline, if it cannot maintain itself at a given
level for internal or external reasons. For example, a given product can never surpass a
certain level of sales even if its price tends to 0, because there is a maximum amount of
people in the market. Sales will never grow to infinity.
2.1.1 Locational Life Cycle
There are three life cycle theories in Economics in the present day focusing on slightly
di↵erent aspects of the theory: industry location, technology and sales/marketing.
The first one was introduced by Vernon (1966) as a criticism and alternative to
the theory of comparative advantage. He argues that it is not the cost of resources
that defines the arrival of new sectors and product innovations, but the proximity to
knowledge sources i.e. the ability to understand the needs of the market, from both
firms and consumers. Two good examples are the advent of the home washing machine
as a need to reduce the costs associated with laundresses; and the tractor, a incredibly
e↵ective labour and time saver for the industry.
It is important to note though that needs arising from firms are more easily identifi-
able than the ones of consumers. Firms usually know what they need to improve their
production system, but it is not always the same with consumers and their needs. That
is why the income of a country and the size of its markets are very important factors
regarding product innovation. The higher the income and the variety of latent needs the
higher is the probability of success in the introduction of new goods. Consumers must
have the means and the wants to pay for modern and expensive products. That would
be why, according to Vernon, the United States would be the perfect place for the birth
innovative activities and also why his life cycle hypothesis is called the locational life
cycle.
However, it is not only in this first birth stage (called new product by Vernon) that
demand and market structure plays an important role on innovation. Although Vernon
did not developed the process of decision on the types of innovation through his life
cycle, he did left us with impressive insights about it. He states that an adequate
answer to the question of how long a product takes to reach its stages “must surely
be a complex one”. This is mainly because investment decisions are not taken in a
rational way and so threats have in general more impact over firms decision than simply
opportunities. Firms feel most threatened by competition and will usually do whatever
it takes to secure markets, home or abroad, so they fear loosing the international market
once internal demand saturates1.
Apart from these considerations, the two other Vernon stages, maturing product
and standardized product, are mainly guided by costs of production and the focus of
1See Schmookler (1966).
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his research is indeed finding the pattern of industry location. In the maturity stage
the industry is usually located at other developed countries and, when the product
reaches full standardization and presents reduced costs the industry tend to move to
developing/underdeveloped countries to grab the last bit of world demand and to reduce
production costs even more.
2.1.2 Technology Life Cycle
Utherback and Abernathy (1978) follow the work of Vernon but focus on explaining
the life cycle through the dynamics of product and process innovation. They divide
what they call technology life cycle into two main stages based on the arrival of the
dominant design. The first stage, pre dominant design, is subdivided into two periods:
embryonic and prenatal, but they are, in fact, very similar to the new product stage of
Vernon because understanding and being able to adapt to the needs of the consumers
before the dominant design arrival is key.
In the second stage that takes place after the arrival of a dominant design, however,
demand e↵ects seems to be completely ignored by the authors and the decision between
process and product innovation arises from diminishing technological opportunities and
from what seems to be an imposed pattern of ordering. First, firms invest only on
product innovation in order to further develop the already defined de facto standard.
It is not viable to invest in process innovation because sales are too scarce for cost
reducing to have an impact. As demand grows process innovation becomes more and
more profitable and diminishing returns to technology kicks in (see the figure 2.2 below).
As pointed by Adner and Levinthal (2001), diminishing returns to technology is heavily
refuted in the literature, as well as the hypothesis that firms do not engage on cost
reducing e↵orts during earlier stages of the life cycle.
Figura 2.2: Dynamics of Innovation on Technology Life Cycle
Still according to the technology life cycle product innovation should decrease after
the earlier stages and eventually come to a full stop, what is also not confirmed in the
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literature (Klepper (1996)). In addition to these critiques, technology life cycle pays
little attention to technology di↵usion, mainly guided by the interaction of agents in the
form of social interactions2
2.1.3 Product Life Cycle
Finally, we have the Product Life Cycle, brought to attention by Kotler (2005).
Despite being considered a marketing theory, it brings important insights about how the
di↵usion of technology takes place through a consumer interaction perspective. Since it
is the only life cycle theory that disaggregates industry behaviour into single products
and series of products sales evolution, it is key for those like us who wish to study the
microeconomic drivers of innovation from consumer networks. Take the smartphone
industry for instance. To be able to understand how the whole industry develops we
need to examine the precesses behind each one of the individual products released. In
the case of product life cycle, an Ipad 6 for example would be a single product while
the family Iphone 6, Iphone 6s and Iphone 6c would be the series of products. The
aggregation of life cycle of these products will then yield a pattern for Apple market
evolution. In other words, it is possible to observe the life cycle of each product resulted
from an incremental innovation in a given industry, and not only the big picture.
Figura 2.3: Product Life Cycle
Figure 2.3 above shows the four stages of product life cycle. In the first or introduc-
tion stage, sales grows really slow because the majority of the population is still unaware
of the product and for that are not, the price is still prohibitive. Companies spend a
lot of money on marketing during this stage and profits tend to be very low or even
negative. Since very few people own the product, the potential for di↵usion through
consumer interaction i.e. word of mouth is little but already begins to take place.
2See Granoveter (1978), Young (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
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When marketing has done its job and new product and process innovations have
been applied to the product fast di↵usion starts to happen and due to a large potential
demand sales increase exponentially due to fast information dissemination of information
and profits usually rises.
In the third stage, maturity, a lot of consumers already own the product and in
consequence the space for growth starts to get narrow. Growth starts to dis-accelerate
as market reaches its saturation point but profit tends to reach its maximum even if
market is highly concentrated since a lot of product and process innovation took place
along with the rise of economies of scale . If an industry or a product reaches its declining
and final stage it means that another new substitute product or technology is stealing
demand.
In the case of high-tech durable goods the only option a firm reaching maturity has
is to heavily engage on R&D trying to sustain a constant de-maturity process3 in which
bandwagon behaviour plays a key role. Unless there is a ground-breaking innovation
almost similar to an invention de-maturity processes usually occur at the level of the
product and not the industry. Some examples include the Iphone generations, the TVs
screen resolution increase and the processing capacity of computers. These de-maturity
process have the power to basically bring saturation down to the first stage levels, since
nobody will own the product and most likely the majority of consumers will be interested
in purchasing it at some point in time.
2.2 Bandwagon Behaviour, Wealth Inequality and
the Di↵usion of Innovations
2.2.1 Bandwagon Behaviour and Innovation Di↵usion
Theories about interpersonal e↵ects on individuals behaviour and consumption pat-
terns in the form of discussions about fashion, fads and conspicuous consumption dates
back at least to the Roman poet Horace. Several subsequent psychologists, sociologists
and also economists, like Veblen, Rae e Von Morgerstern have developed insights about
how the behaviour of our fellow human beings helps to shape our own. Although even
Marshall have acknowledged that the subject was important in the formulation of an
economic theory of wants and needs, he decided to overlook it in his Principles due to
the complexity require in the formalization of these ideas. And so, economy left the
matter outside the scope of classical theory and several years would be required to bring
it back to the spotlight.
It was not until Leibenstein (1950) work that an attempt was made to incorpo-
rate interpersonal e↵ects in classical utility and demand functions. But even then the
concept developed was too minimalist and imprisoned by the requirements of perfect
information of agents and the need to find an equilibrium solution. In fact, the only
assumption relaxed was additivity, with the addition of a therm on utility function that
captures the individual valuation for the amount of a certain good the rest of the popu-
3See Higuchi and Trout (2008).
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lation consumes. According to Leibenstein, this valuation follows a diminishing returns
behaviour which he calls diminishing marginal external consumption e↵ect.
From this point on, authors like Simon, Schelling, Turner, Tversky, Kahneman and
many others started to e↵ectively create stronger connections between economics, psy-
chology and sociology, questioning the realism behind the assumptions of classical eco-
nomic man and creating a new line of research which now is best known as Behavioural
Economics. But BE4 is not only about de-constructing the “super-powers”’ of classical
agents, but to better understand the real complex mechanisms behind our every day
decisions, something that is undoubtedly necessary. But maybe the most important
tools BE brings to economist is the possibility to consider the right causality direction
between macro and microeconomics.
Granoveter (1978), on his seminal paper about collective behaviour implies just that
when he say:
“But I will argue here that knowing the norms, preferences, motives and
beliefs of participants in collective behaviour can, in most cases, only provide
a necessary but not a su cient condition for the explanation of outcomes;
in addition, one needs a model of how these individual preferences interact
and aggregates.”’
And he continues:
“Because theories oriented to norms lack such a model, they end up assuming
a simple relation between collective results and individual motives: that if
most members of a group make the same behavioural decision we can infer
from this that most ended up sharing the same norm or belief about the
situation, whether or not they did so in the beginning.”’
Granoveter (1978) and Granoveter (1986) introduces dynamic characteristics in a
model of collective behaviour and interpersonal e↵ects, unwillingly5 modifying Leibens-
tein’s model in three important ways: first he shifts interpersonal e↵ect on the utility
function from total consumption of agents to how many agents are consuming the pro-
duct at a given time, which seems more realistic. Second, he breaks perfect information
paradigm and set that agents have an adaptive behaviour, being able to acknowledge
only past quantities of adopters. And third, he makes demand heterogeneous by setting
a di↵erent interpersonal e↵ect for each consumer, given by a probability distribution,
in the form of minimum threshold values of adoptions by other consumers that would
trigger each individual to follow the bandwagon and follow the collective behaviour.
His model became known as the Linear Threshold Model, largely used in innovation
di↵usion literature.
As also pointed out by Rosenkopf and Abrahamson (1997) and Rosenkopf and
Abrahamson (1999), collective behaviour, social networks and interpersonal e↵ects are
4Behavioural Economics.
5Granovetter does not seem to draw from the work of Leibenstein but the resulting models are
theoretically related.
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closely related to the intrinsic process behind innovation di↵usion and these process are
not limited only to consumer interaction, they also apply to the firms decision to adopt
a certain technological innovation in their production processes.
It is important to note, however, that the use of thresholds to characterize individuals
preferences towards the adoption of new products, technology or behaviour can lead to
counter-intuitive results in which very small shifts in the initial distribution of thresholds
(preferences) might have extremely strong e↵ects on the extent of a product di↵usion.
Bandwagon theories of innovation can be broadly classified in two types: E cient-Choice
theories and Fad theories
E cient-Choice theories assume that agents adopt innovations based on information
about their e ciency, utility of profitability6 varying only regarding the availability of
this information. When information is complete7 firms instantly receive information
about the profitability of a new innovation and decide to adopt solely based on their
internal capacities and technology. Imperfect information8 may arise from simply un-
certainty about profitability of innovations or because of defined social networks with
closed access to external agents. In both cases, available information grows with the
evolution of the number of adopters.
Fad theories of bandwagon focus on the fear of incurring serious costs from mis-
sing the opportunity to adopt a successful innovation. It can be an institutional cost9,
in which firms by not adopting a successful innovation have their image jeopardized
with stakeholders, consumers and society in general, or a competitive cost10 in which
a firm fails to implement a key process innovation that greatly reduces cost and loses
competitiveness in the market. Fad theories are also usually associated with reputa-
tion issues where adoptions by agents with a high reputation influences imitations by
lower-reputation ones seeking to remain competitive and strong before stakeholders and
consumers.
As mentioned before, linear threshold models of bandwagon can lead to unrealis-
tic results specially because every time the minimum threshold among non-adopters is
higher than the number of adopters di↵usion stops. The problem is deepened by the fact
that little is known about the real distribution of thresholds among consumers for each
type of product or behaviour being di↵used. It is also arguable to assume that these
given thresholds are fixed or even exists since consumer preferences are often changing,
human memory is imperfect and a lot of decisions are taken based on cognitive biases
and heuristics11.
One alternative is to consider stochastic threshold processes instead of determinis-
tic. In this case, probability of adoption increases with the number and percentage of
individuals that already adopted a given innovation. In this case, a given innovation
might fail to di↵use completely not because a certain threshold was reached, but because
6E cient-Choice theories are usually utilized to characterize firms decision process, but can be easily
modified to represent consumer choices by e.g. using the concept of utility other than profitability
7See Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Katz and Shapiro (1985).
8See Valente (1996) and Rosenkopf and Abrahamson (1997).
9See Rosenkopf and Abrahamson (1993).
10See Rosenkopf and Abrahamson (1993) and Banerjee (2014b).
11See Gilovich et al. (2008) for more information on cognitive biases and heuristics.
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demand did not grow fast enough for the innovating firm to continue accruing profits
from the new product or technology.
Young (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2011) o↵er alternatives12 or extensions to the
linear threshold model in order to address these issues. Drawing from the ideas of Blume
(1993) and Ellison (1993), Young develops a stochastic threshold model in which the
probability of a given person to adopt one of two possible actions in a given time period
is assumed to be a increasing logistic function of the number of his or her neighbours
who have already adopted it. Acemoglu also develops a stochastic threshold model in
which consumer decision to adopt a given innovation follows a Bernoulli trial with an
homogeneous parameter among consumers.
Product Life Cycle Theory can be called to help clarifying the pattern of stochastic
thresholds in a population. There are several authors13 that contributes to di↵usion li-
terature by performing a categorization of adopters based on their innovativeness profile
i.e. the point in time they decide to adopt the new product or technology. A recent em-
pirical study performed by Moore (2005) finds percentages for each one of the consumer
profiles in the market. The following profiles are similar to Rogers and are presented
in decreasing order of appreciation towards new technology or products: visionaries
(12.5%) may not buy the product at the time of the release but they have a high pro-
bability to buy it soon. Pragmatists (35%) and conservatives (35%) correspond to the
bulk of population and are similar to early majority and late majority profiles. Finnaly,
skeptics (15%) rarely care for new products even when the majority of the population
owns it.
2.2.2 Inequality and Innovation Di↵usion
Contrary to the e↵ects of bandwagon behaviour, the relationship between inequality
and innovation di↵usion has received little attention in economic research14. Despite
the fact that inequality is a hot topic in economics at the moment due to the alarming
empirical confirmation15 that inequality has been significantly increasing in the past
30 years in America and the world, there seem to be almost no interest so far in the
microeconomic issues of inequality, which could help clear most the mechanisms through
which inequality influences - or not - macroeconomic variables.
According to Moss et al. (2013), this could be due to the lack of behavioural stu-
dies regarding the heterogeneity of consumer decision under di↵erent wealth and social
status. Although few, there are some important conclusions about behaviour under
di↵erent levels of inequality.
Loughnan and et. al. (2011) suggests that societies with greater income inequality
tend to exhibit higher self-enhancement and optimistic behaviour from individuals with
a notably better social status than the average. Consequently, these individuals tend to
be more adept to risky investments.
12Stochastic threshold models are not new in social sciences. See Dieckmann and Mitter (1984) for
early usage examples of these types of models.
13See Rogers (1995) and Moore (2005) for good examples.
14See van den Bulte and Stremersch (2013) and Kandler and Steele (2009) for important exceptions.
15See Piketty (2013).
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Franck et al. (2010) argues that the recent increase in inequality stimulated a cascade
e↵ect on consumption with individuals from middle and poor classes trying to imitate
the consumption patterns of other individuals in their social networks which earns mar-
ginally more by contracting debts. This positional consumption behaviour16 is one of
the arguments that could explain Piketty’s claim that inequality was one of the main
causes for 2008 financial crisis.
Theoretical formal models developed by Foellmi (2005), Zweimuller (2000) and Fo-
ellmi et al. (2014) suggest that inequality a↵ects the firm decision between process and
product innovation. Firms tend to consider the pay-o↵ between producing only for the
rich, with higher quality, which implies a constant e↵ort on product innovation, and
investing on process innovation to reduce costs and prices to reach a higher share of the
market. They find that when firms seek to maximize profits higher inequality yields
more product innovations from the market, leading to exclusion of a good part of the
poorer consumers.
2.3 Modelling Bandwagon Behaviour in Agent-Based
Models of Technology Di↵usion
In this section we review some of the main strategies for modelling bandwagon beha-
viour and technology di↵usion in agent-based-models.
2.3.1 Small World Networks and Threshold Models of Bandwa-
gon
When modelling innovation di↵usion through bandwagon behaviour economists and
sociologists usually make use of directed and undirected graphs and small world networks
as framework for the analysis. A directed graph is a set of vertices (nodes) connected
by directed edges (links). The direction of the edges imply causality or direction of
transmission. In an undirected graph the edges does not have directions implying that
the interaction between nodes are symmetrical and transmission occurs from both sides.
Small world networks are graphs, usually undirected ones, arranged in a circle in a
matter that each node connects to its closest k neighbours clockwise and anti-clockwise.
Aside from the edges created this way, a few other edges are created randomly between
the nodes. Small world networks were first discussed by psychologist Stanley Milgram17.
the idea behind it is that despite the fact that most nodes (individuals) does not know
each other (are connected to), they are a few steps18 away from basically everyone else
in the world. Milgram suggested that most of United States population is within six
degrees of separation from one another.
Small worlds also features a stochastic “rewiring”’ rate, which is a constant proba-
bility that a certain node breaks one of his edges and creates another with a random
16Bernardino (2013) explores the issue of positional consumption in an agent-based model.
17See Milgram (1967).
18Maximum amount of edges he has to go through to reach the furthest agent in the graph
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other end. This type of graph is very popular for being a elegant framework to cap-
ture individual bounded information19 besides allowing control of important variables
such as the length between nodes (number of steps required to reach one another) and
clustering coe cient. It can also support both linear and stochastic threshold models
of bandwagon. The model can also be extended to support reputation heterogeneity
amongst individuals (nodes) in the stochastic case.
Figure 2.4 below show an example of two graphs with small world characteristics20,
the left one implying perfect information and the right one bounded information.
Figura 2.4: Perfect and Bounded Rationality Small World Undirected Graphs (Ring
Shaped)
Consider a small world network represented by the undirected graph  , with a set
of consumers (nodes) ⌦ = {1, ..., N} connected by a set ✏ of edges (links). Note that
the bars delimiting the terms in the numerator and denominator of the first term of the
equation denotes cardinality i.e. the number of agents on each of the sets In a linear
threshold model, agent i will adopt an innovation at time k if:
|{Sk 1t=0  (t)} \⇥i|
|⇥i|    ) i 2  (k) (2.1)
where  (t, k) is the set of all agents who already adopted the innovation at time (t, k),
⇥i = {j|(j, i) 2 ✏} is the set of neighbours of agent i connected by the set of edges ✏,
and  i is the deterministic threshold of agent i.
Note that, as  i is deterministic, if the percentage of neighbours who already adopted
the innovation, given by the firs term of equation X, is less than  i, agent i will not
adopt.
Acemoglu et al. (2011) develops a model, which he calls Stochastic Threshold Model,
where thresholds   remain deterministic, but consumers, after having there thresholds
surpassed, immediately incur in a decision process to decide whether it adopts the
19A perfect information environment would be nothing more than the smallest world possible, with
everyone directly knowing (being connected) everyone else.
20Be aware that Small World Networks does not necessarily need to be built in a circle or ring fashion.
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product or not, following an irreversible21 Bernoulli Trial with probability ⇢ to adopt
(xi = 1) and 1  ⇢ otherwise (xi =  1). Agent i in this cases will consider the adoption
if:
|{ ˆ(0)Sk 1t=0  (t)} \⇥i|
|⇥i|    ) i 2  ˆ(k) (2.2)
where  ˆ(t, k) is the set of agents considering adoption at time (t, k) and  (t) = {i 2
 (t), xi(t) = 1} is the set of agents who e↵ectively adopted at time (t).
Clearly, thresholds themselves are not stochastic, but the one time decision pro-
cess through Bernoulli trial indeed is. The problem is that Acemoglu’s model implies
that consumers absolutely never consider, not even by a faint chance, to adopt a new
product before reaching his threshold, even when he is already exposed to it by being
directly linked with one or more neighbours who already adopted. This seems quite
counter-intuitive and conflictual with some behavioural biases that creates randomness
on consumer decision such as memory biases22, humor e↵ects23, and impulsive buying24.
Young (2002) develops a di↵erent approach that generates stochastic thresholds de
facto. Agents are also distributed in a small world network and at each time t choose
between consuming products A or B depending on their individual preferences but also
on social pressure. The pay-o↵ of agent i is given by an utility function of the form:
Ui =
X
 i,ju(xi, xj) + vi(xi)|{i, j 2 ✏} (2.3)
where  i,j is a weight for the social pressure given by the utility of conforming (u(xi, xj))
- with xi and xj being the state of choices25 of agents i, j - and vi(xi) represents the
individual preferences of agents.
Agents update their state at each point in time according to a logistic function of the
payo↵ di↵erence between the two possible actions (consuming A or B). The probability
of agent i to choose product A is thus given by:
⇢Ai |x i =
e↵[Ui(A,x i) Ui(B,x i)]
[1 + e↵[Ui(A,x i) Ui(B,x i)]]
(2.4)
where x i is the set of choices of all other agents such as (i, i) 2 ✏ and ↵ is a parameter
controlling the impact of the gap between states on the probability of adoption.
Young’s stochastic model seems adequate to be considered closest to reality than
Acemoglu’s model or any other linear threshold model. However, a static small world
network, while suitable to analyse process of di↵usion, incur on serious limitations when
the analysis need to be expanded beyond just di↵usion e.g. if one wants to develop a
more complex model with markets to capture other agents - such as firms - decision
making processes. This is true because of the fact that agents does not have mobility on
21A decision taken cannot be changed during time.
22See Park and Lessig (1981).
23See Markiewicz (1974).
24See Kollat and Willet (1964).
25Whether they are consuming product A or B.
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SWNs26 and thus the possibilities for modelling interactions with other types of agents
or with the environment is severely limited27.
2.3.2 Spatial Dynamic Awareness Model (SPADA)
We propose a new approach to agents interaction in which agents (nodes) are not
static, i.e. they randomly move around across a bi-dimensional wrapped28plain. By
doing so, agents are always changing their relative positions to other agents and thus
have the opportunity to interact with di↵erent sets of neighbours at each point in time.
Neighbourhood of a given consumer i at time t in this case is defined not by previously
randomized edges, but by the set of other agents currently inside consumers i awareness
at time t.
We define the awareness29 of an agent i as a circle of radius ⇤ around the centre of
agent i that captures his capability to perceive and draw information from other agents
and from the environment around him30.
Imagine an individual in the metro heading to work. He might be paying attention
to the people standing or sitting next to him but he might also be distracted drowned
in thoughts about job or family or just texting something on his cellphone, for example.
These two di↵erent scenarios yields two di↵erent awareness radius. In the second case,
for example, he might miss the fashionable new high-tech smartphone another individual
in the same wagon, but sitting a bit distant from him, is using, but he will probably
notice it if the individual is standing or sitting right next to him.
Consider now that he did see the other individual smartphone. It might fit his
personal technological tastes perfectly, causing him to rush to a smartphone store to
buy it on the very same day. In this case, awareness played an important role on
innovation di↵usion even without any social pressures, because the adoption of the new
product by our test subject happened exclusively because of his personal tastes. Now
imagine that our subject is fond of technology, but not so desperate to acquire new
expensive products right when he sees it. As time passes and he catches the same train
to go to work or any di↵erent train to get wherever, chances are that he will see more
and more di↵erent people wearing the same phone and might decide that is time to
switch his outdated phone by a state of the art one.
This time our little wagon interaction, if the readers pardon the pun, yielded a
bandwagon behaviour, but one that has little to do with his social network31.
26Small World Networks.
27There are other possibilities such as the use of evolutionary NK models. See Valente (2008) for
more information on NK-based models.
28When an agent cross any of the boundaries of the plain he arrives at the other side.
29For more information about awareness in social sciences see Chugh and Bazerman (2007).
30Another advantage of the SPADA model is that, since there are no directed or undirected edges, it
allows for easy modelling of di↵erent influential weights between agents in the same neighbouring set.
31One can argue that the concept of social networks might cover the set of all people a given agent
meets, but that is quite unrealistic and broad.
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Figura 2.5: Awareness Radius Forming a Neighbouring Set
Awareness can be heterogeneous regarding individuals and time. The framework in
figure 2.5 shows examples of heterogeneous consumer awareness radius yielding di↵erent
neighbouring sets of di↵erent sizes. Bandwagon pressures may arise from both the total
amount and the percentage of people who adopted a certain product in the neighbouring
set.
Consider a set of consumers with normally distributed heterogeneous preferences
towards the adoption of new technologies, given by  , and homogeneous awareness
radius ⇤ that are randomly spread across a bi dimensional wrapped plain  . Consider
also that the set of consumers who already adopted a recently released new technological
product z is given by  z. At any point in time t, the neighbouring set of individuals
who can potentially influence a given consumer i is given by ⌦i(t) = {j | (j, i) 2 ⇤i},
where j comprises all of the individuals in range of consumer i awareness. Consumer
is influenced both from the amount and percentage of neighbours who have already
adopted. Decision process is given by:
 i
✓
↵
| z(t) \ ⌦i(t)|
|⌦i(t)| + (1  ↵) | z(t) \ ⌦i(t)|
◆
>   ) i 2  z(t+ 1) (2.5)
where 0  ↵  1 is a constant denoting the weights for total and percentage of adopters
and   is a random number drawn from an uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Also
note that the bars surrounding the numerator and denominator of the first term on the
left denotes cardinality i.e. the number of items inside each set.
Figure 2.6 below show simulation results of the model di↵usion pattern for di↵erent
consumer awareness radius values. We can clearly see that innovation di↵usion follows
the traditional Product Life Cycle S-shape and that as rationality increases do does
di↵usion.
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Figura 2.6: Results From SPADA Model
There are several ways in which SPADA model can be expanded to fit di↵erent
formats of interaction. One may argue, for example, that even though the di↵erent
daily interactions and environment perceptions we incur every day are important to
shape bandwagon behaviour, social networks such as family, friends and colleagues have
a stronger impact on shaping ones decision. A simple modification of the model handles
this concern.
Consider that ⇥i = {j|(j, i) 2 ✏} is the set of neighbours of agent i connected by the
set of edges ✏ representing an individual social network. For simplicity, also consider that
this time consumers can only be influenced by the percentage of consumers they know
who already adopted the product (and not by also the amount). Consumer decision will
be given by:
 i
✓

| z(t) \⇥i(t)|
|⇥i(t)| + (1  )
| z(t) \ ⌦i(t)|
|⌦i(t)|
◆
>   ) i 2  z(t+ 1) (2.6)
where 0 <  < 1 is the chosen weight for social network interaction.
Figure 2.7 below exemplifies the awareness + social network connections:
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Figura 2.7: Agents Forming Neighbouring Sets Through Awareness And Edges
Finally, SPADA model can also feature a system of learning and forgetting. As in
our bandwagon smartphone example from before, an individual might accumulate the
experiences of meeting other agents who already adopted a new product and build up
the will to acquire it himself. However, it is safe to assume that our individual will
not be able to keep exact track of how many adopters he has seen because of memory
limitations. For simplicity, we can assume that this becomes a continuous process, other
than discrete. Recall that | z(t) \ ⌦i(t)| is the amount of agents in awareness radius
⇤i of consumer i that have already adopted a new technology. Thus, the process of
accumulating and forgetting bandwagon experience can be viewed as:
Ei(t+ 1) = | z(t) \ ⌦i(t)|   Ei(t) (2.7)
where Ei is the accumulated bandwagon experience and 0 <   < 1 is the forgetting rate
(memory loss) of consumers.
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Cap´ıtulo 3
The Echoes of Bandwagon Through
a Complex System of Innovation
and Development
More than 100 years after the seminar work of Schumpeter the study of innovation
still holds some important uncovered topics of research, specially regarding more com-
plex subjects such as how demand heterogeneity and the real behaviour of agents a↵ects
its size, rate, type and di↵usion. In this chapter, we seek to contribute to the literature
analysing how preferences guided by bandwagon behaviour may a↵ect innovation deci-
sions. More specifically, the decision of a firm to choose between process and product
innovation given the state of the market. Due to the degree of complexity involved in the
matter, we choose to build an agent-based model where agents have bounded rationality
and sequentially make non maximizing decisions based on the amount of information
they have about the market. The rationality degree can be exogenously adjusted set-
ting the awareness capability of consumers. As a core of bandwagon behaviour, each
consumer is a↵ected by the decision of others and the resulting cascade e↵ect yields dif-
ferent impacts on the economy depending on the inclination of each agent towards new
products. There are in total five types of consumers: techies, visionaries, pragmatists,
conservatives and skeptics, in decreasing order of bandwagon behaviour degree. We find
that the greater the number of techies, the faster is the saturation and de-concentration
of the market, generating more product than process innovations, higher mean prices
and profits of firms.
3.1 Introduction
Dating back from Schumpeter (1934), literature on innovation has evolved to the
point of leading its object of study to the status of one of the main forces driving
economic growth and development. The fact that Sollow TFP1 black box might not
be so black anymore has certainly something to do with understanding how the engine
of innovation is greased. In this paper, we suggest that one of the cogwheels of this
1Total Factor Productivity.
21
engine is the bandwagon behaviour of consumers, its impact on innovation di↵usion
and, ultimately, on the firm’s decision to engage on a certain type of innovative process.
Bandwagon e↵ect was first introduced by Leibenstein (1950) based on previous con-
tributions of past economists, psychologist and sociologists, such as Veblen (1899), Rae
(1905) and Morgenstern (1948), in the phenomena of fashion and conspicuous consump-
tion. Developments of this field in innovation literature yielded sophisticated formal
threshold models of innovation di↵usion through social networks from both the supply
and demand points of view, especially Granoveter (1978) and, more recently, Rosenkopf
and Abrahamson (1999), Young (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
The recent increase in computational capacities and its popularization in economics
are key factors to understand why these subjects are back on the spotlight. Demand
heterogeneity suits itself much better in complex environments and models that cannot
yield useful solutions other than through simulation. It is also very hard to fit consumer
interaction into equilibrium models which only reinforces the need of proper agent-based
models to capture all the nuances behind it.
With all this information at hand, it is perfectly arguable that the product cycle
theory ruled by the triad Vernon (1966) - Utherback and Abernathy (1978) - Kotler
(2005) might be outdated or in need of some re-discussion. A lot has changed since VHS
and innovation is now viewed more as a survivability necessity than a profit maximization
luxury. New high-tech products such as smartphones, TV’s and computers presents a
much higher rate of creative destruction. Product innovation does not seem to slow
down as predicted by the first two Life Cycle theories yielding great di↵erentiation that
creates changes ranging from small, to ones big enough to challenge the dominant design.
The fact is that these industries cannot rely on market expansion, already saturated,
and even less on repeated purchases given how durable the products are.
The only solution is then to engage heavily on R&D2 to be able to sustain a cons-
tant de-maturity process (see Higuchi and Trout (2008)) in which consumer bandwagon
behaviour plays a key role to success. The bandwagon behaviour was described by
Moore (2005) and its details will be stretched further.
Have you ever seen those hundreds of kids camping outside malls to be the firsts
to put their hands on new Iphones? According to Moore (2005) they are called techies
and correspond to about 2.5% of the consumers. They are followed by visionaries
(12.5%), pragmatists (35%), conservatives (35%) and skeptics (15%), in decreasing order
of appreciation towards new technology.
We propose to take the next step in bandwagon theory regarding innovation and
investigate how the emergent pattern of di↵usion from consumers bandwagon e↵ect
shapes the market and influences the firm decision between process and product in-
novation. This interactive behaviour is determinant to understand how the speed of
technological change shape societies and promotes economic development and welfare.
In order to do so, we build an agent-based model where consumers have bounded
rationality and sequentially make non maximizing decisions about buying only one pro-
duct from the available firms. Consumers are heterogeneous in respect to what we call
profile towards new products and follow the distribution proposed by Moore (2005) as
2Research and Development.
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a baseline. Since our consumers do not have information about global demand or pre-
ferences, the probability to change consumption choices plays the role of thresholds.
Consumers can only get information about quality and prices by interacting with each
other when they are inside each other’s awareness radius (similar to Chugh and Bazer-
man (2007)). Consumers then evaluate how many others are using a given product or
technology and decide to change their product of choice or not. Firms on the other hand
cannot see individual preferences, but analyse market saturation and concentration to
decide on the amount of R&D investment and between process and product innovation.
The type of innovation intended to be modelled in this present chapter and in the
subsequent one is incremental innovation at a high-tech industry. The Product Life
Cycle generated by the model does not intend to fit all industries and most certainly not
the entire life cycle of a given industry from birth to death. Again, we are concerned with
the dynamics of incremental innovations that generates di↵erent products and versions
of products such as the Iphone series example already pointed out in this document.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 presents a formal agent-based model
in which consumers have bandwagon behaviour and influences process and product
innovation decision by firms. Section 3.3 presents and discusses the results and, finally,
section 3.4 brings the conclusions.
3.2 The Model
In this section we present a formal agent-based model based on the SPADA fra-
mework described in chapter 2 where consumers have bounded awareness and sequenti-
ally make non maximizing decisions about buying only one product from the spectrum of
available firms. Consumers are heterogeneous in respect to what we call profile towards
new products and follow the distribution proposed by Moore (2005) as a baseline. Since
our consumers do not have information about global demand or preferences, the proba-
bility to change consumption choices plays a stochastic role of traditional deterministic
thresholds. Consumers can only get information about quality and prices by interacting
with each other when they are inside each other’s awareness radius3. Consumers then
evaluate how many others are using a given product or technology and decide to change
their product of choice or not with probability  . Firms on the other hand cannot
see individual preferences, but analyse market saturation and concentration to decide
on the amount of R&D investment on each period t and between process and product
innovation. There are strong interactions between consumers and consumers, and con-
sumers and firms which produce complex dynamics of innovations, cycles and economic
development. The cyclical sequence of steps of the simulation model is described in
figure 3.1 below:
3Similar to Chugh and Bazerman (2007) and Ellison (1993).
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Figura 3.1: Sequential Steps of The Simulation Model
A table (table A.1 containing a brief explanation of all variables described in the
model as well as the simulation codes can be found in Appendix A and B at the end of
the document.
3.2.1 Consumer Interaction and Bandwagon Behaviour
Consider a constant length set of consumers given by ⌦ = {1, ..., N} with hetero-
geneous profiles (propensity to assimilate new technologies or products) that follows a
quasi-normal distribution in respect to their probability of incidence in the population
described in table 3.1 below. Each consumer !i carries an intrinsic propensity to adopt
new products according to their profile, which we call stochastic bandwagon threshold
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( ). Consumers are randomly spread and randomly move across a bi-dimensional wrap-
ped plain   characterizing our economic space.
Tabela 3.1: Bandwagon Population
Type % of population  
Techies 2.5 1
Visionaries 12.5 0.8
Pragmatists 35 0.6
Conservatives 35 0.4
Skeptics 15 0.2
Consumers have the same bounded awareness represented in the model by a circle
of radius ⇤ ✓   around them4.
Consumers can also die with the probability k4 2 [0, 1], but they immediately give
birth to another agent with the same profile, the only di↵erence being that new consu-
mers enter into the space   with no supplier5. This mechanism is introduced in order
to capture the e↵ects of new agents constantly entering the market. since they have
no information whatsoever about products prices and quality they are important to
contribute to smaller firms demand and thus prevent monopoly situations. The set of
consumers at time t, ⌦ = {1, ...., N} as well as its distribution is, nevertheless, always
kept constant6
At any point in time t, consumers may own only one product z of quality q, supplied
by firm x 2 {0, ..., X} for which they pay the price ⇢.7. However, they can be influenced
to change their adopted product if they are inside each others awareness radius i.e., if
they are neighbours with relative position between (!i,!j) = (0, 0...⇤) in the plain. In
this coordinate 0 means the reference point where the consumer stand, from which he
or she can see by a distance of radius ⇤. The neighbouring set of individuals who can
potentially influence consumer i 2 ⌦ in time t can then be described as ⇥i(t) = {j |
(j, i) 2 ⇤i}, where j comprises all of the individuals in range of consumer i awareness
(⇤i). The consumers j inside the view radius of consumer i carry some information
which can convince or not he or she buy the new product. For example, it can happen
that a consumer j be a skeptic who not bought a new technology yet, therefore, do not
carry information about quality q and price ⇢ of a new product.
We assume that at the initial state of the model t(0) there is only one incumbent
firm that invents a brand new type of high-tech product and immediately engages in
marketing activities capturing all consumers with a techies profile. These “crazy for
technology” consumers will also instantly buy any new better quality versions of the
4Note that this is not the same radius suggested by Young (2002) in his model where agents are
distributed along the edges of a radius.
5And consequently without a product, quality, price paid and so on.
6This is a necessary condition to analyse how changes in the distribution (more precisely the number
of techies) a↵ects the evolution and final stage of the model during simulation.
7We choose to make two distinctions about notation: between the price paid by a consumer ⇢ and
the price charged by a firm p; and between the consumer product provider   and the firm per se x.
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product provided they are clients of the innovating firm at the time of product innova-
tion8. At time t the subset of consumers who adopted a given product z in the market
is given by  z(t) ✓ ⌦.
A consumer i /2  z(t) may be influenced once per time by his neighbours to change
his product in two distinct situations: when faced with one or more neighbours j who
have adopted: a) a better quality product; or b) a product of the same quality from a
firm with a lower price. If there is more than one di↵erent product quality perceivable
from ⇤, Consumer i will only consider to change for the best one.9
Adoption by quality
We will start by addressing the first case. A consumer i /2  z(t), walking randomly
through our plain, meets in his awareness radius ⇤ at least one neighbour who owns a
better quality product zj > zi. The probability that consumer i will be influenced to
buy the better-quality product he saw will be a↵ected by three factors: the amount and
percentage of the neighbours owning that product at time t and consumers i bandwagon
profile. The decision process is detailed below. Note that the bars delimiting the terms
in the numerator and denominator of the first term of the equation denotes cardinality
i.e. the number of agents on each of the sets. The decision is:
 i
✓
k1
| z(t) \⇥i(t)|
|⇥i(t)| + (1  k1)
1
1 + e | z(t)\⇥i(t)|
◆
> ✏) i 2  z(t+ 1) (3.1)
where ✏ is a random number following a continuous uniform distribution over the range
✏ = U [0, 1] and {0  k1  1} is a constant measuring the impact of each type of influence.
Note that the second term inside the parenthesis on the left side of the equation has a
sigmoid shape to ensure values between 0 and 1.
Now10. consumer i is left with the decision of where to buy the product, i.e. from
which one of the available firms. If there is only one candidate j 2 ⇤i(t) for potential
influencer in consumer i awareness radius ⇤i, the decision is straightforward and he will
buy from his neighbour’s supplier so that  i(t+1) =  j(t). However, in cases where the
subset  z(t) \ ⇥i(t) is non-unitary, it may be possible that there will be two or more
neighbours who are clients of di↵erent firms. How will consumer i choose between the
available firms? He will choose to buy the selected product from the firm that incurs
him the lowest e↵ort ei. The e↵ort of a given consumer i to buy a product z from a
provider firm   is given by:
ei = ⇢i,  + k2di,  (3.2)
8Techies will always act as seeders of the new versions of the product.
9Pay close attention to the fact that consumers will also always prefer a quality change over a price
change in the form: q   ⇢, (q   ⇢V q ⌃ ⇢). i.e., there is no utility function in the model in the form
of a trade-o↵ between quality and price because consumers are assumed to have enough income to buy
any product they want. We shall discuss income inequality later in this thesis.
10From here on we will drop the time notation when it is not necessary.
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where ⇢i is the price paid by agent i for product zi of firm  i at time t, di is the distance
between the consumer i and his supplier  i and 0  k2  1 is a constant measuring the
impact of distance on a consumers e↵ort.
But consumer i does not have information about the prices of all firms in  , therefore
he will need to choose based on the e↵ort information gathered from his neighbours
j 2 ⇤i(t). The firm   choose by consumer i will depends on the interacting process
given by:
 i = argmin {ej( j) |  j 2 {1, ..., X}; j 2 ⇤i(t)} (3.3)
where ej( j) is the e↵ort the consumer i must incur to reach a firm ( j) into its view
radius (⇤i).
Adoption by price
Now consider the second setting of interaction between consumers in which  z(t) \
⇥i(t) = ;. In this case, consumers bandwagon behaviour neither the amount and
percentage of neighbours who owns a product with a lower price matters because they
are not analysing a change in product quality/technology. However, we assume that
there is an associated cost in changing the firm providing products for consumer i and
thus changing is not guaranteed, but depends positively on the di↵erence between the
price paid by him ⇢i and by consumer ⇢j11. Consumer i will ultimately change his
supplier  i if his new e↵ort ei(⇢j, j) is lower than the current one ei(⇢i, i). The
interaction results in:
 i(t+ 1) =  j(t) if (1  ⇢j
⇢i
) > ✏ and ei(⇢j, j) < ei(⇢i, i) (3.4)
Besides being influenced by neighbours, consumers can also be influenced by firms
inside ⇤i. The set of firms that can influence consumer i at time t is given by ⌅i(t) =
{x | (x, i) 2 ⇤i}12. Similarly to the pure consumer interaction there are two ways in
which a firm may influence a given consumer i to change his product: a) there is at least
one firm x in ⇤ selling a product with a better quality than zi; and b) there is at least
one firm o↵ering a product with the same quality as zi but for a lower price.
In the first scenario, consumer i finds a firm x with a better quality product zx > zi
than he has and is influenced to buy it. The decision whether to adopt or not adopt this
product and supplier will depend solely on consumer i bandwagon profile according to:
 ik3 > ✏) zi(t+ 1) = zx and  i(t+ 1) = x (3.5)
where 0  k3  1 is a constant.
11As in the previous case consumers will only consider to be influenced by his neighbour with the
lowest price.
12Note, though, that individuals cannot interact with buildings so we assume that the interaction
occurs between a consumer and a salesman trying to convince him to buy the latest best-quality product
of the firm.
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If the set ⌅i(t) = {x | (x, i) 2 ⇤i} is non unitary, there might be two or more firms
charging di↵erent prices px for products with the same quality. In this case consumers
will always prefer the firm o↵ering product with the lowest price:
 i = argmin
x
{p(x) | x 2 {1, ..., X}} (3.6)
The second setting presents the case in which a consumer owning a product with
quality qi finds a firm x selling the same product for less money i.e., px < ⇢i. Analogously
to the pure consumer interaction consumer i will decide between changing his supplier
or not based on the di↵erence between the price he is paying for the product and how
much the firm is selling it for:
 i(t+ 1) = x if (1  px
⇢i
) > ✏ (3.7)
3.2.2 Firm Behaviour
As mentioned in the previous section, at time t(0) only one incumbent firm13 creates
a new economic sector or market14 by inventing a product and immediately captures
the demand of techies. From this point on new firms can enter and exit the market if
they find it profitable, considering the option of investing in bonds paying the constant
interest rate r. Thus at a given time t 6= 0 there will be a set F = {1, ..., X} of firms
in the market. Firms produce goods on-demand and thus doesn’t accumulate stocks.
There is also no kind of economies of scale or scope i.e., cost reduction arises only from
successful process innovations.
There are two pivotal decisions a firm has to make in the model: how much to spend
in research and development activities and what type of innovation to pursue given the
market situation at any point in time. Based on the literature, we assume that market
saturation and competition play a key role on a firm innovative decisions.
R&D expenditures decision
Despite Schumpeter’s claim that monopoly power provides incentives for innovation
by raising the firm’s capabilities, recent literature on the subject15 shows that it is
usually competition that fuels innovation. The argument is that competition raises the
intrinsic costs of falling behind in competitiveness by failing to successfully engage on
R&D activities. Aghion et al. (2002) finds that these two e↵ects combined generates an
inverted-U relationship between the variables. Up to a certain level, competition creates
incentives for innovation because firms try to become more competitive reducing costs
or di↵erentiating products, but if competition gets to fierce, profits tend to fall along
with resources available for R&D. In our model we assume that investment in R&D is a
13Adding more incumbent firms does not change the outcome of the model except for the initial HHI
concentration index.
14The new sector can be view both as industry or service.
15For more details about the relationship between competition and innovation see Aghion et al.
(2002), Aghion et al. (2006) Tomohiko et al. (2008)
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positive function of competition but since the amount invested is given by a percentage
of profits, competition might hinder innovation if it heavily impacts profit.
Pasinetti (1981) has long ago stated that saturation is a natural bottleneck for eco-
nomic growth and development. Even in the case of a incredibly high and sustainable
productivity growth, population would have to grow accordingly for saturation not to
happen, which does not seem to be the case for most developed and developing coun-
tries. The way firms deal with saturation is through a life cycle de-maturity process
of product innovation, specially in durable goods industry where re-buying takes time
to occur. McMeekin et al. (2002) provides a great overview of the literature relating
aspects of demand with innovation. We use Saviotti and Pyka (2012) equation that
relates search activities with market saturation16 and a similar function to competition
impact on innovation to define the percentage of profits a firm will secure for R&D at
any point in time:
✓x = k4(1  e( k5Sx)) + k6(1  e( k7HHI)) (3.8)
where ✓x is the chosen percentage of profits secured for R&D, 0 < k4,...,7 < 1 are
constants, HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index and Sx is the market saturation for
the best-product of firm x. HHI and Sx are given by:
Sx =
PN
i=1[Ci | zi = zx]PN
i=1[Ci | zi 6= 0]
(3.9)
HHI =
X
x=1
ms2x (3.10)
where msx is the market-share of firm x. Thus the investment in R&D of firm x at time
t is given by:
IR&Dx = ✓x⇡x (3.11)
with
⇡x =
ZX
z=1
(Dx(px   cx) (3.12)
where ⇡x is the profit, Dx, px and cx the demand, price and cost for each product of
firm x.
Innovation type decision
After deciding on the amount of R&D resources, firms have to decide in what type
of innovation firms are going to invest these resources. It is reasonable to assume17that
16It is important to note that firms will always consider the saturation of their best-quality product
for innovation decisions and not the global saturation level
17This is a subject yet to be better explored by the literature since results are still inconclusive. Some
examples of papers in this area are Bonanno and Harworth (1998) and Rosenkrantz (2005).
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market saturation has a bigger impact on product innovation than process innovation
because a firm can only overcome saturation with process innovation while there is
still a potential demand to be conquered. However, it is a little more complicated to
infer the contrary for market competition, since both product and process innovation
can help a firm to gain a competitive advantage18. Nevertheless, we assume that firms
will prefer to invest in product innovation only when market saturation is higher than
market competition and saturation is above a certain threshold Smin. This is due to the
fact that product innovation is considered to be more di cult to successfully implement
than process innovation, since it requires consumers approval.
Type =
⇢
Product) IR&Dx (t) = IPDx (t) if Sx(t) > H(t) & Sx(t) > Smin
Process) IR&Dx (t) = IPCx (t) otherwise (3.13)
where PD means product innovation and PC process innovation. The probability of
arrival of an innovation type is a linear function of the total amount of investment in
one of them. It follows that:
 PD,PCx = k
PD,PC
8 I
PD,PC
x (3.14)
where 0 < kPD,PC8 < 1 are constants.
E↵ects of successful innovations
We now turn our attention to how a successful innovation changes the innovating
firm status. Consider first the case of product innovation. When a firm manages to
succeed in product innovation in time t, it uses all it’s R&D resources of that type19
to start producing, at t + 1, a new product of better quality than its previous best
(Qz,x(t+1) > Qz,x(t)), at a higher cost (cZ,x(Q, t+1) > cZ,x(Q, t)) that will be added to
the set  x(q, t) = {1, ..., ZQ} of all products, ordered by their quality, being demanded
to firm x. The new product is immediately adopted by the firm x set of “techies”
clients20. We can summarize the impact of a product innovation as:
 PDx > ✏)
8><>:
ZQ,x(t+ 1) 2  x(t+ 1)
QZ,x(t+ 1) = Qz,x(t) + ( q)
cZ(Q, t+ 1) = ( PDc )cZ(Q, t)
(3.15)
where it is assumed that  q21 and  PDc
22 are constant in time parameters measuring
the impact of product innovation on QZ and cZ respectively.
18See Porter (1999).
19In this case IPDx .
20If a firm does not possess any costumer with techies profile the only way it can di↵use the new
innovation is through consumer/firm interaction.
21We assume  q = 10 although it may take any positive value without changing the outcome of the
model.
22We follow Adner and Levinthal (2001) and assume  c = 0.2.
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Process innovation, on the other hand, has the sole e↵ect of reducing the cost of
production of all of a firms products:
cz(t+ 1) =  
PC
c [cz(t)] if  
PC
x > ✏ (3.16)
Price setting behaviour
Firms are engaged in Bertrand competition defining their prices primarily by a mark-
up rule, but also considering the mean price of firms in the market when |⌅| > 2. We
assume that prices are somewhat sticky, meaning that firms will wait a certain threshold
number of periods (⌧) before reacting to market-share (MSx) alterations in order to
assay if the tendency is persistent or seasonal.23. The price pz,x charged for product z
of quality q by a firm x at time t is given by:
pz,x(t) =
(
µx(t)cz,x(t) if |⌅|  2
k9µcz(q),x(t) + (1  k9)
PX
x=1 pz,x
|⌅| if |⌅| > 2
(3.17)
where µx(t) is the mark-up of firm x at time t and 0 < k9  1 is the impact of mark-up
on a firms price decision24
Firms alter their mark-up according to:
µx(t) =
⇢
µx(t  1) + k10µx(t  1) if MSx(t  ⌧) < MSx(t  ⌧ + 1).... < MSx(t)
µx(t  1)  k10µx(t  1) if MSx(t  ⌧) > MSx(t  ⌧ + 1).... > MSx(t)
(3.18)
where 0 < k10 < 1 is the mark-up changing reaction.
Entry/exit mechanism
At any point in time a prospective firm faces the decision of entering given the
market situation. In order to make the decision, it is assumed that possible entrants
observe the mean profit rate of currently operating firms, the saturation of the best-
quality product and the concentration of the market. The higher the market profits and
concentration and the lower the saturation, higher the probability to enter25. Entrants
will only be willing to produce the best-quality product in the market at time of possible
entry. Additionally, the saturation of the chosen product cannot be higher than 50%26.
Best-quality product saturation is given by:
23Due to managerial costs such as menu, customer negotiation and information gathering costs. See
Zbaracki et al. (2003) and Dias et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion.
24Simulating the model we will assume that k9 = 0.6 based on studies of Keney et al. (2010) who
finds that the share of firms that set their prices by mark-up is about 60% while 40% of firms set their
prices by looking at the other firms prices.
25See Dixit (1989) and Chang (2009) for studies about firm entry/exit decision.
26We assume a firm will never be willing to enter the market producing a good that is close to
maximum saturation because the entrant won’t have time to accumulate R&D investment for product
and process innovation and will most likely fall behind on technology and product quality.
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SZ(t) =
PN
i=1[!i | zi(t) = Z(t)]
N
(3.19)
where zi is the product being consumed by consumer i.
The mean profit rate of firms is:
$ =
PX
x=1
PZ
z=1$z,x
Z
X
(3.20)
where $z,x = ⇡z,x/Ix is the profit rate of product z of firm x.
And thus the decision of a given firm to enter the market is given by:
Entry =
⇢
Yes if SZ < 0.5; $ > r; $SZH > ✏
No Otherwise
(3.21)
Firms will exit the market if their mean profit-rate over a range T of periods is
smaller than the interest rate r, which means firms fight to remain in the market even
when profit-rates are smaller than the other possible investment option27. At any point
in time a firm will check the mean of its last T profit-rates and compare it to the interest
rate:
Exit =
(
Yes if
Pt
t=t T $x(t)
T < r
No Otherwise
(3.22)
3.2.3 From micro behaviour to aggregated results
Before we go into the results of the model using a series of di↵erent simulation runs
for each condition of interest, it is important that we analyse interesting macro patterns
only observable when we consider a single simulation run, which means the resultant
behaviour of variables is not a mean from several simulation runs. We are then able to
shed some light in the “black box” that many consider agent-based models to be.
The figure 3.2 shows how the de-maturity process takes place in our economy and
how some key variables such as quality and costs react to it. Note that saturation of a
product of given quality - represented by the colourful lines28 in the de-maturity graphic
- follows a S-shaped curve as expected from empirical observations. Each time a new
product is released demand saturation enters a new cycle as consumers are instigated
by bandwagon behaviour to update the quality of their product. This creates degrees
of product quality and costs, since each product innovation raises the mean cost of
production by a small margin. We can also see the evolution of the mean profit between
firms with the best quality in time t and the others as well as the mean mark-up and
the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index.
27Is is assumed that there is no depreciation in the model which implies that a firm would be able to
fully recover its initial investment Ix if they decided to sell their infrastructure.
28Only the first five product qualities are visible.
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Figura 3.2: The Pattern of Variables on a Single Simulation Run
3.3 Results
In this section the simulation results of the model are presented in six di↵erent
scenarios in which di↵erent values for two key variables are assumed: consumers awa-
reness radius (⇤ = {1.5, 2, 2.5}) and the percentage of techies amongst the population
(techies = {3%, 9%, 15%}). In order to ensure robustness, 100 simulation runs are per-
formed for each scenario, for a total of 600 runs over a time period of t = 2000. Results
are presented for every variable in the model, but the analysis focus lies on the evolution
of market saturation, concentration, and the pattern of product and process innovation
adopted by firms given market conditions. Similar to Adner and Levinthal (2001), it
is possible to use the firms cost curve to evaluate the incidence of process and product
innovation on each scenario given that firms cost is only a↵ected by process (negative
impact) and product innovation (positive impact). A positive relationship between cost
and time indicates that firms have prioritized product over process innovation and vice
versa. The models baseline is considered to be the case of techies = 3% and ⇤ = 2.
It will be shown that the impact of awareness radius and the percentage of techies
in the proposed economy are quite similar, except for some few important peculiarities.
However, it is fundamental to stress the complete di↵erence between the logic and
meaning associated with these two variables.
In this model, the awareness of an individual is a direct measure of rationality.
If awareness radius is set to the maximum possible ( /2), that means consumers can
perceive the consumption behaviour of every single agent in the economy at any point in
time, which is rather unrealistic. But note though, that even so, it would not be possible
to assume perfect rationality since the agents in this model cannot predict the future
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and foresee the decisions of consumers and firms alike. What can be safely argued is that
awareness is a variable that probably does not change much from market to market. Of
course, individuals have di↵erent interests and thus pay attention to di↵erent patterns
of fashion but rationality is not expected to change that much and is probably not
expected to be perfect.
The percentage of techies, on the other hand, simply refers to the amount of people
in the economy that are willing to buy new products as soon as they are released and
thus it is a variable strongly related to the degree of technology of the given market.
It would be at least odd to watch people lining up early in the morning in front of the
supermarket just to buy the new type of frozen lasagne a certain brand announced.
Table 3.2 below shows information about the values taken by constants in our model,
which remains unchanged between scenarios:
Tabela 3.2: Model Constants
Constant Value Constant Value
Incumbents 1 Population 100
k1 0.5 k2 0.03
k3 0.05 k{4,..,7} 0.2
kPD8 0.01 k
PC
8 0.08
k9 0.6 k10 0.05
r 0.05  PDc 0.2
 PCc 0.044 cz,x(0) 1
x(0) 0.2 QZ(0) 15
3.3.1 Varying Awareness
Changing the value of awareness radius has clear impacts over all variables of inte-
rest in the model. Lets start with the impact of awareness on market saturation. As
mentioned in the previous section, there are certain variable patterns that are better
observable when considering only one simulation run. Take saturation for example. Fi-
gure 3.3 below shows the mean best-quality product market saturation (SZ(t)) of 100
simulations each point in time.
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Figura 3.3: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on Market Saturation (100 runs)
Since in every simulation the exact time of innovations arrival vary, it is di cult to
observe product cycle and de-maturity patterns on aggregate simulations results. Ne-
vertheless we can still observe that higher values of awareness yields saturation curves of
higher frequency and higher spikes, indicating that awareness positively a↵ects satura-
tion speed and the maximum saturation achieved just before a new product innovation
arrives. It is much easier to see this looking at just one simulation run29 on figure 3.4:
Figura 3.4: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on Market Saturation (1 run)
29Thus, we use simulations 1, 101 and 201 to create figure 3.4 from each awareness value on figure
3.3
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With a bigger awareness radius ⇤, or rationality, consumers are able to observe more
individuals and therefore the probability to be influenced rises. Thus, a new product is
di↵used faster in the market raising the speed of saturation and consequently yielding
more innovations along the observed period of time.
Figure 3.5 below that shows the evolution of quality in our economy for each ⇤ also
confirms that.
Figura 3.5: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on the Evolution of Product
Quality
The higher the awareness the more frequent is the arrival of product innovations led
by faster market saturation. Thus, the economy reaches higher product qualities. It can
then be implied that growth and development are also higher, taking into consideration
the important fact that there are no restrictions to technology, nor budget restrictions
in our model.
The impact of awareness radius on market concentration is, however, not so straight-
forward because of the endogenous nature of the model. A higher awareness not only
leaves consumers more susceptible to adopt new products, but also to pursue better
prices. That means consumers will be changing suppliers more frequently which can
be good for competition30. Additionally, since awareness a↵ects saturation speed and
maximum saturation before product innovation, it may leave a smaller time gap for
firms to enter the market and start investing in innovation, providing some advantage
to incumbent firms and even more to the firm that manages to be the first to create
a new best-quality product. This also pressures firms to invest a bigger part of their
profits on R&D, driving weaker firms out of the market.
Figure 3.6 below shows the e↵ect of changing awareness on HHI.
30Mark-up adjustments will be more frequent raising price competition but not necessarily market
competition because firms that fail to reduce their costs through process innovation will be punished
harder.
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Figura 3.6: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on HHI
A considerable di↵erence is only observable when ⇤ = 2.5. It may suggest that
before a certain threshold, ⇤ has an ambiguous e↵ect on HHI, but after the threshold is
surpassed consumer awareness begins to become negatively correlated with competition.
Now consider the impact of awareness on cost shown in the figure X below. In the
models baseline scenario it can be seen that the cost initially rises, about t = 200 and
then slowly falls from t = 750, until it stabilizes at initial value c = 1 from t = 1250 on.
This suggests a predominance of product innovation at the beginning of the time frame
which is slowly traded for process innovation at later stages of the market. This finding
is consistent with Life Cycle Theory that theoretically predicts this pattern. Results
are also comparable to Adner and Levinthal (2001), except that they consider a smaller
time lapse which might explain why the initial parts of his baseline cost curve has a
more distinguishable hump-shape.
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Figura 3.7: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on the Mean Cost of Firms
Awareness has clearly a powerful e↵ect over the cost of firms and thus the pattern
of product and process innovation. When awareness is bigger (smaller) than the base-
line, market achieves saturation faster (slower) and thus R&D investments on product
development grows (decreases) in proportion to process innovation driving the costs up
(down).
Finally, figures 3.8 and 3.9 below show results for the impact of awareness on profit
related variables: the mean mark-up and product innovation profitability of firms, this
last one measured as the di↵erence between the mean profit of firms selling the best-
quality product at each point in t and the mean profit of the rest of the firms.
Figura 3.8: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on Mean Mark-Up of Firms
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Figura 3.9: The Impact of Di↵erent Awareness Radius on Product Innovation Profita-
bility
Product innovation profitability evolution behaves as expected. A larger awareness
increases di↵usion speed and thus raises profitability of new product. On the other
hand, mean mark-up of firms seems to achieve its maximum with ⇤ = 2 which, at least
in the spectrum of the economy modelled here, contradicts the claim that a greater
market concentration directly implies higher mark-ups.
In the first stages of the market, the fast drop on concentration caused by the entry of
the first non incumbent firms drives mark-ups down mainly because the incumbent has to
adjust its prices to respond to entrants competitiveness. However, as mentioned before,
fast technological advances makes more di cult for new firms to succeed, causing the
entry/exit process to be more unstable and thus also mark-up adjustments. Additionally,
the fact that the ratio product/process innovation is greater with larger awareness make
the impacts of cost reductions smaller preventing large firms to have big cost advantages
over other firms and thus making it more susceptible to price wars.
3.3.2 Varying Techies
The e↵ects of varying the percentage of techies in the market are similar to those
obtained changing awareness but with a few important peculiarities.
First, although it is observable that a higher techies percentage in the market also
accelerates the speed of di↵usion, it is not possible to infer that it raises maximum
saturation achieved during each cycle. This is expected, since, unlike awareness shifts,
di↵erences in the number of techies does not a↵ect the acceleration31 of innovation
di↵usion, only its speed. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 bellow show saturation curves for the
cases of 1 and 100 runs.
31Acceleration can be viewed as the second derivative of the life cycle (saturation) function.
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Figura 3.10: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on Market
Saturation (100 runs)
Figura 3.11: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on Market
Saturation (1 run)
The evolution of product quality over time yielded the expected results. The higher
the number of techies in the market, faster is the market saturation, leading firms to
heavily invest on product innovation. It is interesting to note that, as can be seen in the
figure 3.12 below, in the case in which techies correspond to 15% of consumers, results
show that the curve can behave exponentially, indicating that the time between product
innovations is getting shorter as time passes, albeit product quality is assumed in the
model to present linear growth.
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Figura 3.12: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on the
Evolution of Product Quality
Results on market concentration also follow the same pattern as the awareness analy-
sis, except this time the positive relationship between number of techies and HHI holds
in the three scenarios analysed, in contrast to awareness e↵ects in which only the maxi-
mum awareness level tested yielded significantly di↵erent results.
Figura 3.13: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on HHI
Raising the number of techies in the market also raises mean cost of firms, an indica-
tive that firms are engaging more heavily on product innovation than process innovation.
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Again, we can see an explosive tendency on the curve related to the maximum percentage
of techies tested. Figure 3.14 below shows the results.
Figura 3.14: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on the
Mean Cost of Firms
Finally, mean profits and profitability also rise with the increase in the percentage
of techies. The once again present explosive tendency, this time of profits, may indicate
that raising the percentage of techies above a given threshold may cause a certain degree
of disequilibrium in the model. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine a society where so
many consumers are of “crazy-for-innovation” profile.
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Figura 3.15: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on Mean
Profits of Firms
Figura 3.16: The Impact of Di↵erent Percentages of Techies in the Population on Pro-
duct Innovation Profitability
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter an agent-based model was presented with the goal to formalize and
test the e↵ects of bandwagon behaviour on the firms decision between process and pro-
duct innovation. The chosen strategy was to test di↵erent values of consumer awareness
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- which in this model are closely related to the degree of agents rationality - and percen-
tage of techies in the market, a type of consumer that immediately buys new products
at the exact time they are released.
Since there is still no empirical confirmation of the model, results should be viewed
with precaution and considered purely theoretical. That being sad, results are very
interesting and show that both awareness and percentage of techies have a positive
e↵ect on the ration between product and process innovation i.e. firms tend to value
more product innovation over process innovation when rationality and percentage of
techies increases. We also find that increasing awareness has a positive e↵ect on the
profitability and price charged by the firms, while the percentage of techies also a↵ects
mean profits of firms in the market and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of market
concentration.
There are several ways in which this model may be upgraded in future researches.
A formal process of production decision could be incorporated, as well as labour market
and consumer income inequality. The assumption of homogeneous awareness among
consumers can be relaxed to capture the idea that some consumers are better informed
than others.
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Cap´ıtulo 4
Wealth Inequality and the Pattern
of Innovation
In this section we present an agent-based model that seeks to capture the relationship
between heterogeneous consumer behaviour in the face of unequal wealth endowments
and firms decision process between investing in process or product innovation. We are
motivated by the recent increase in global income inequality and the lack of consensus
among economists about its causes and the evaluation of its consequences.
Regardless of causes and consequences, public managers and economists probably
should not deliberately strive for a more unequal society. However, the discussion about
growing or dividing the cake is still an important one specially for developing countries
since the literature, so far, has failed to reach a consensus1 on the macroeconomic
impacts of income and wealth inequality.
While this lack of consensus might exist due to the simple fact that inequality may
have no impact on the macroeconomic variables of common interest such as growth,
employment, poverty, technological change, political outcomes and financial crisis, it
might also be the case that economists have not fully understood exactly how inequality
relates to these other subjects.
Motivated by the second option, we draw from the discussion presented by Moss
et al. (2013) and assume that the mechanisms of transmission from inequality to macro-
economic variables are still mostly unknown to economic theory due to the lack of un-
derstanding on how di↵erent individuals behave according to their social status position
in the relevant population. This clearly seems to be another problem of microeconomic
foundations shortage while trying to tackle an economic problem.
Results suggest that, despite the existence of an ambiguous theoretical e↵ect of
inequality over innovation, a more egalitarian society drives both product and process
innovations up and leads to a more competitive market, with lower prices mark-ups
and profit margins. Inequality always prevent product diversity and causes a higher
exclusion of consumers from the demand for the latest best-quality product.
1See Moss et al. (2013) et al for a great review on the lack of consensus on inequality theory.
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4.1 Introduction
The growth of world income inequality in the past 30 years (See figure 4.1 below),
specially in the United States, but also in countries who supposedly had already reached
a stable egalitarian society like Sweden, has renewed economists concern in the matter,
recently feeding heated discussions about its causes and consequences, With one side
claiming it to be a natural and beneficial process of capitalism while the other viewing
the process as harmful and even the main cause for 2008 financial crisis.
Figura 4.1: World Income Inequality
French economist Thomas Piketty2 is considered to be the sparkle generator. He
argues that the recent increase in income inequality is caused by the fact that the rate
of capital return is greater than the growth of GDP3specially on developed countries
and the natural and only solution to this problem would be to raise taxes on the richest
consumers.
Inequality is, however, a complex subject influenced by many other causes in ad-
dition to Piketty’s. Amongst them, globalization of trade and finance is considered to
have a positive e↵ect on inequality by allowing multinational firms to shift labour and
capital requirements spendings from home to countries where those inputs are cheaper.
Decreasing power of labour market institutes and the slowing down of redistributive
policies are also considered important facts for the recent rise in inequality. Finally, it
is assumed that technological progress has ambiguous e↵ects on inequality. The reason
is that while the raise in profits and skill requirements tend to raise inequality, higher
productivity arising from production process improvements have the opposite e↵ect.
Regardless of causes and consequences, public managers and economists should never
2see Piketty (2013), Piketty (2006) and Piketty (2014).
3Gross Domestic Product.
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deliberately strive for a more unequal society. However, the discussion about growing
or dividing the cake is still an important one specially for developing countries since
the literature, so far, has failed to reach a consensus4 on the macroeconomic impacts of
income and wealth inequality.
While this lack of consensus might exist due to the simple fact that inequality may
have no impact on the macroeconomic variables of common interest such as growth,
employment, poverty, technological change, political outcomes and financial crisis, it
might also be the case that economists have not fully understood exactly how inequality
relates to these other subjects.
Motivated by the second option, we draw from the discussion presented by Moss
et al. (2013) and assume that the mechanisms of transmission from inequality to ma-
croeconomic variables are still mostly unknown to economic theory due to the lack of
understanding on how di↵erent individuals behave according to their social status po-
sition in the relevant population. This is clearly another problem of microeconomic
foundations shortage while trying to tackle an economic problem. More specifically, we
seek to analyse how the distribution of wealth shape the market pattern and thus the
firm decision between process and product innovation.
Theoretical work on the subject has yielded an ambiguous relationship between in-
come distribution and inequality. Authors like Zweimuller (2000), Iacopeta (2008), Fo-
ellmi (2005) and Foellmi et al. (2014) have suggested that, usually, a firm has a decision
to make between investing in product innovation, to satisfy the needs of the rich agents,
or process innovation, to make existing goods cheaper and conquer the demand of low
income agents. This decision process, as already seen, is part of the Product Life Cycle
Theory where given product starts at the top of the quality ladder and then gradually
falls behind and end up being consumed only in underdeveloped markets by low income
individuals.
The common conclusion of the aforementioned papers is that inequality fosters pro-
duct innovation and equality drives process innovations up. This is because the larger
the gap of wages and purchase power the costlier is for the firm to reduce prices so much
to be able to sell to the bulk of consumers.
There are several examples of such phenomenon: cars, televisions, cellphones and
basically all durable goods consumed in large scale nowadays started out incredibly
expensive as a “luxury”to satisfy the needs of the rich and then after several process
innovations can now be consumed basically by everyone, at least in developed countries.
But still only a given portion of the population can immediately purchase the latest
vintages of these durables.
Empirical analysis are usually focused on the other way around, trying to deter-
mine whether innovation increases or decreases income inequality. Aghion et al. (2015)
and Banerjee (2014a) finds similar results that shows a positive relationship between
innovation and top income inequality, while Jones and Kim (2015) achieves opposite
conclusions.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents a formal agent-based
model in which consumers unequal wealth endowments and quality preferences influences
4See Moss et al. (2013) for a great review on the lack of consensus on inequality theory.
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process and product innovation decision by firm. Results are presented in section 4.3,
while the general conclusions can be found in section 4.4.
4.2 The Model
In this section another agent-based model featuring SPADA framework is presen-
ted. Although similar to the one in the previous chapter, there are several important
di↵erences to be described in this section5
The main di↵erence between this and the previous model is that consumer heteroge-
neity arises from a uneven distribution of wealth other than from di↵erent bandwagon
profiles. Consumers forming the set ⌦ = {1, ..., N} can still only buy one unit of one
product at a time, are randomly spread across a bi-dimensional wrapped plain, defined
by  , and have a fixed awareness radius of ⇤ ✓  , but this time bandwagon behaviour
i.e. the propensity to be influenced by the set ⇥i(t) = {j | (j, i) 2 ⇤i} of neighbours is
the same for all consumers and defined by  . This time, however, we introduce a process
of bandwagon accumulation and forgetting similar to equation 2.7 in which consumers
have an amount of prolonged perception subject to memory limitations i.e. they are
constantly forgetting older interactions. We call this process prolonged awareness, or E.
Additionally to bounded awareness, consumers also have no information about new
products until successfully interacting with one of his neighbours. Even after the in-
teraction, however, information about quality of the new product is not precise and is
based only on a measure of perceived quality that decreases with time.
With regard to firms, there is again only one incumbent at time t(0) that creates
a new economic sector or market by inventing a completely new product. This time
however, there is no initial marketing engagement by the incumbent and so consumers
need necessarily to “drop by”’ the firm to be able to cognize the new product. Firms can
still freely try to enter or decide to exit the market assessing the other investment option
available in the framework which yields the constant interest rate r. Thus at a given time
t 6= 0 there will be a set ⌅ = {1, ..., X} of firms in the market producing a given number of
products on-demand6 that can be raised by introducing a new product through product
innovation while product technology can be raised by process innovation thus reducing
costs.
Costs can also be reduced by an exogenous process of learning-by-doing over time,
while the quality of a product, although it remains unchangeable over time, falls to
the eyes of consumers, who make purchasing decisions also based on this decreasing
perceived quality
Since this model features wealth inequality, firms now make the decision between
trying to perform product or process innovation di↵erently from the previous model and
use information about profits in the market instead of saturation and concentration.
This is done to follow the literature on the subject which states that firms will keep
investing in process innovations with the goal of lowering prices only until profits are
5We will refer to equations from the previous chapter to describe processes that are identical to
those in that model.
6Or, in other words, by request of consumers.
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rising with demand i.e. the e↵ect of increasing sales on profit is higher than the negative
e↵ect of decreasing mark-ups and prices. The cyclical steps of this model simulation is
similar to the one on the previous chapter and are described in the figure 4.2 below:
Figura 4.2: Cyclical Steps of The Simulation Model
A table (table C.1 containing a brief explanation of all variables described in the
model as well as the simulation codes can be found in Appendix C and D at the end of
the document.
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4.2.1 Wealth Distribution and Utility
Wealth distribution of consumers is assumed to be exogenous and previously defined
by a two-parameter log normal distribution with PDF7 given by:
PDF =
1
w 
p
2⇡
e 
(ln x ⌘)2
2 2 (4.1)
where w is the wealth and  , ⌘ are the distribution parameters.
Thus, it is straightforward to note that the wealth of a given consumer will be given,
according to log-normal distribution, as:
w = eµ+ ⇣ (4.2)
where ⇣ is a standard normal variable8
The choice for a log-normal distribution9 has to do with limitations of other types of
distributions commonly used to capture income and wealth inequalities. Pareto distri-
bution is the most famous among them and has a simple connection to Lorenz Curves
and Gini coe cient, but the fact that it only has one parameter makes it inappropriate
to test di↵erent income inequality scenarios since they would yield di↵erent wealth/in-
come means on each simulation. Weibull distribution, also commonly used, has the two
parameters needed to maintain the mean wealth constant with varying Gini indexes
by setting one of the parameters as a function of the other. However, the resulting
equation and the connection between Weibull distribution and the Gini index would
be much more complicated to derive then in the case of log-normal distribution. The
aforementioned equations will be shown in section 4.3.
After being assigned with a di↵erent wealth endowment, consumers are organized
into one of three predefined possible social classes: poor, middle (middle class) and
rich, with the percentage of consumers in each class being defined as 5% of riches,
35% of middles and 60% of poor. Each class values product perceived quality and price
di↵erent in their utility functions, with the richer consumers preferring perceived quality
over price and vice-versa.
The utility of a consumer is composed of two distinct terms. The first one takes
into consideration only individual preferences and is given by a Cobb-Douglas function
of perceived-quality and price10, controlled by a parameter ↵ which captures consumer
preferences towards perceived-quality given their social class, with 0 < ↵p < ↵m < ↵r <
1. The distance from a consumer to a product also a↵ects utility, with closer goods
being preferred over distance ones. The impact of distance is controlled by ⇠d and it is
assumed that poor people places more value on distance than the other classes11
The second part of the utility captures bandwagon e↵ects i.e. the utility gained by
adopting the patterns of consumption of others. We assume that consumer bandwagon
7Probability Density Function.
8A normally distributed random variable with expected value 0 and variance 1.
9See Yurko (2006) for another example of log-normal distribution implementation to capture income
inequalities.
10See Kalman (1968) for a review of the use of prices in utility functions.
11To capture the notion that poor people usually have less urban mobility in most cities.
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behaviour follows a process similar to Robert Frank’s12 “expenditure cascade”’ e↵ect in
which consumers feel the need to try to imitate consumption patterns of the class just
above their own13. The utility obtained by consumer i from consuming product z is
finally given by:
Ui,z = ⌫
↵
z
✓
1
pz
◆1 ↵
  ⇠di,z + k0Ei,z (4.3)
where ⌫z and pz are the perceived-quality and price of product z, Ei,z is the prolonged
awareness and 0 < k0 < 1 is a constant measuring the impact of bandwagon behaviour
on utility. E is going to be described a little further in this section.
4.2.2 Dynamics of Perceived Quality and Price
The evolution of the perceived quality of a product ⌫z brings an important discussion,
directly connected to the behaviourist aspect of the utility function presented above,
as well as some required simplifications to be implemented in the model. There is
a vast literature14 on the subject in which several arguments to consider perceived
quality among consumers to be heterogeneous, such as brand reputation, personal past
experience, price-as-quality situations and obsolescence with time. However, as far as the
authors could research, there is no theoretical link between wealth inequality or social
classes with di↵erent perceptions of quality. As much as it presents itself as a most
interesting topic for future research, it is not the focus of this model and, since here
the heterogeneity of demand only arises from di↵erent wealth endowments, a decision is
made to consider perceived quality as homogeneous among consumers and monotonically
decreasing with the age15 of a product (⌧z)
This, however, does not exclude the opportunity to insert a degree of behaviour
economics in our ⌫ dynamics. Additionally to considering it decreasing with time, we
follow the work done by the likes of Leavett (1954) and Putler (1992) and assume that
perceived quality of a product is positively related to the products price. Thus, dynamics
of perceived quality over time has two di↵erent components and is given by
⌫z = qz(⌧
 o
z + e
k1(pz  )) (4.4)
where qz and ⌧z are the quality and the age of product z, o is an exogenous obsolescence
rate of products, k1 > 0 is a constant capturing the extent to which consumers are
influenced by price to consider perceived quality and   is the reference price of consumers
in comparing perceived qualities by price.
Now lets take a look at the other component of the individual preferences part
of utility function: prices. The cost evolution of a product over time also has two
12Franck et al. (2010) suggests that rapid income growth concentrated among top earners in recent
decades has stimulated a cascade of additional expenditure by those with lower earnings.
13Poor consumers will try to imitate the middle class and the middle class will try to imitate rich
people.
14See Ding et al. (2010) and Pamela (2007) for further information on perceived quality mechanics.
15The duration of the period since the product has been introduced by a given firm.
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components: learning-by-doing16 and the level of technology, the latter being a↵ected by
the introduction of successful process innovations. The process of learning-by-doing17is
similar to the one impacting perceived quality and resembles Arrows classic form of
the learning e↵ect. Technology (Az), on the other hand, depends on the rate of arrival
of process innovations which in turn depends on the R&D investments on this type of
innovation by the firm producing the given product. Dynamics of product costs are thus
given by:
cz(⌧) = cz(0)[a
 ◆
z (t)  (Az(IPCx , t)  1)] (4.5)
where 0 < ◆ < 1 is a parameter controlling the speed of learning-by-doing and Az(IPCx ) is
the technology of product z at time t which depends on the amount of R&D investment
on process innovation by firm x, producer of product z.
Firms are engaged in Bertrand competition and set their prices for each of their
products based on a mark-up rule over costs. It is assumed that firms adjust their mark-
up in response to increases or decreases in their products market-share. The di↵erence
from the previous model lies in the fact that now each product has its own market-share
so the firm can have a better control of each one of them, balancing between higher
mark-ups for the newest products sold with low competition for rich consumers and
lower mark-ups for old saturated products with higher competition that pleases poor
consumers. The price pz,x charged for product z of quality q by a firm x at time t is
given by:
pz,x(t, ⌧) = µz,x(t)cz,x(t, ⌧) (4.6)
where µz,x(t) is the mark-up of product z of firm x at time t.
Note that the prices and costs doesn’t vary only with time, but also with the age
of each product. Mark-ups, however, are not dependant of product age. Prices are
sticky in this model so firms wait a period T of time18 before making the decision of
altering the mark-ups of their products in order to assay if the tendency is persistent or
seasonal.19. Mark-up adjustment process is given by:
µz,x(t) =
⇢
µz,x(t  1) + k2µz,x(t  1) if MSz,x(t  T ) < MSz,x(t  T + 1).... < MSz,x(t)
µz,x(t  1)  k2µz,x(t  1) if MSz,x(t  T ) > MSz,x(t  T + 1).... > MSz,x(t) (4.7)
where 0 < k2 < 1 is the constant amount of mark-up change when adjusted.
16See Arrow (1962) and Leiby et al. (1997) for more information about learning-by-doing theory.
17It is important to note that the concept of learning-by-doing here is distance itself from economies
of scale, since costs drop with age and not with the size of demand
18Note that in the previous model ⌧ was used to express this waiting period, but since this Greek
letter is already being used to express product age it is substituted here for T .
19Due to managerial costs such as menu, customer negotiation and information gathering costs. See
Zbaracki et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion.
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4.2.3 Consumer Decision
With the information of prices and perceived qualities at hand, consumers can pro-
ceed to decide which one of the available products to buy. However, at time t(0), they do
not have acknowledgement about the new marker created by the incumbents invention
and from this point are required to visit a firm to cognize new products or, in the case
that other consumers have already acquired the product at time t 6= 0, to interact with
them getting to know the products they are consuming.
The process of interaction between a given consumer i, other consumers and firms
is very similar to the one presented in the previous model, except this time bandwagon
behaviour   is homogeneous among consumers and after a successful interaction the
purchase of a new product might not take place immediately since consumer i might
not have enough wealth to buy the new product, or may not be interested to change
products according to his utility value. Nevertheless, if a consumer interacts with other
consumers or firms that possess di↵erent products from the ones he already know, he
will have a chance to add these products to his list of products known.
We will start by addressing the case in which consumer i meets other consumer(s)
in his awareness radius ⇤i. Consider by  i(t) = {1, ....,1} the set of products known
to consumer i at a given time t. At each point in time consumer i will choose only one
consumer (if any) j 2 ⇤i to interact with. If consumer j owns a product not yet known
to consumer i (zj /2  i) that product will be added to the list of products known by
consumer i,  with probability  . The process is detailed below:
zj(t+ 1) 2  i(t+ 1) if zj(t) /2  i(t) and   > ✏ (4.8)
Consumer interaction also a↵ects prolonged awareness. For simplicity, we can assume
that E is a continuous process, other than discrete. Recall from the previous model that
| z(t) \ ⇥i(t)| is the amount of agents in awareness radius ⇤i of consumer i that have
already adopted a new technology. Thus, the process of accumulating and forgetting
bandwagon experience can be viewed as:
Ei(t+ 1) = | z(t) \⇥i(t)|   Ei(t) (4.9)
where 0 <   < 1 is the forgetting rate (memory loss) of consumers.
At each point in time consumers choose the product yielding them the highest utility
value from the set of products known Zi(t). Substituting equation 4.3 on equation 4.9
we have the decision process of consumers:
zi = argmax
z
⇢
⌫↵z (
1
pz
)1 ↵   ⇠di,z + k0Ei,z | z 2 Zi
 
(4.10)
4.2.4 Firms Procedures
R&D Investment Decision
The firms decision on the amount of R&D expenditures at each point in time perfectly
resembles same the one in the previous model, with market saturation and competition
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playing a key role on the firms decision. A higher saturation increases the firms concern
about the eventual total saturation of demand and stagnation of sales and thus its R&D
expenditures. A higher market competition also raises R&D expenditures by increasing
the intrinsic costs of failing to innovate and eventually fall behind in the technology
ladders. The process is described in the equations below:
✓x = k3
 
1  e( k4Sx) + k5  1  e( k6HHI)  (4.11)
where ✓x is the chosen percentage of profits secured for R&D, 0 < k3,...,6 < 1 are
constants, HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index and Sx is the market saturation for
the best-product of firm x. HHI and Sx are given by:
Sx =
PN
i=1[Ci | zi = zx]PN
i=1[Ci | zi 6= 0]
(4.12)
HHI =
X
x=1
ms2x (4.13)
where msx is the market-share of firm x. Thus the investment in R&D of firm x at time
t is given by:
IR&Dx = ✓x⇧x (4.14)
with
⇧x =
ZX
z=1
Dx(px   cx) (4.15)
where ⇧x is the profit, Dx, px and cx the demand, price and cost for each product of
firm x.
Entry and Exit
The decision of a prospective firm to enter the market is identical to the previous
model. At any point in time a prospective firm faces the decision of entering given the
market situation. In order to make the decision, it is assumed that possible entrants
observe the mean profit rate of currently operating firms, the saturation of the best-
quality product and the concentration of the market. The higher the market profits and
concentration and the lower the saturation, higher the probability to enter. Entrants
will only be willing to produce the best-quality product in the market at time of possible
entry. Additionally, the saturation of the chosen product cannot be higher than 50%20.
Best-quality product saturation is given by:
20We assume a firm will never be willing to enter the market producing a good that is close to
maximum saturation because the entrant won’t have time to accumulate R&D investment for product
and process innovation and will most likely fall behind on technology and product quality.
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SZ(t) =
PN
i=1[i | zi(t) = Z(t)]
N
(4.16)
where zi is the product being consumed by consumer i.
The mean profit rate of firms is:
$ =
PX
x=1
PZ
z=1$z,x
Z
X
(4.17)
where $z,x = ⇡z,x/Ix is the profit rate of product z of firm x.
And thus the decision of a given firm to enter the market is given by:
Entry =
⇢
Yes if SZ < 0.5; $ > r; $SZH > ✏
No Otherwise
(4.18)
Exit however is a little di↵erent, since firms in this model can choose to shut-down
a specific product line if the firm finds it to be unprofitable. Firms will decide to shut-
down a product if its profit-rate over a range T of periods is smaller than the interest
rate r, which means firms fight to keep their products alive as long as possible. Firms
will still choose to exit the market according to equations X, but the process of shutting
down a specific product is described below:
Exit =
(
Yes if
Pt
t=t T $z,x(t)
T < r
No Otherwise
(4.19)
where $z,x is the profit-rate obtained by firm x from selling product z.
Innovation type decision
A given firm x decide on what type of innovation to invest their R&D accumulated
resources based solely on the weighted average of profits amongst firms producing the
same product as firm x best-product. It means that firms will always be looking to
the market performance of their best-quality product. If profits are on the rise, it is
still worth it to invest in process innovation to raise demand, but if profits already
start falling, firms are better o↵ trying to introduce a new product in the market.
This mechanism is suggested in several theoretical papers on the relationship between
inequality and innovation, such as Foellmi (2005) and Foellmi et al. (2014). The weighted
average profits a given firm x with best-quality product Zx is concerned is given by:
⇧ =
ZX
z=1
⇧zDz
Z
| z = Zx (4.20)
In order to discover if ⇧ is increasing or decreasing, given that it yields a set of
discrete measurements, one can make use of the centred di↵erence method, given by:
⇧˙(t) =
⇧(t)  ⇧(t  #)
 t
(4.21)
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where # corresponds to the size of the period analysed by the firm to make the decision.
The decision process can then be summarized as:
Type =
(
Product) IR&Dx (t) = IPDx (t) if ⇧˙ < 0
Process) IR&Dx (t) = IPCx (t) otherwise
(4.22)
where PD means product innovation and PC process innovation. The probability of
arrival of an innovation type is a linear function of the total amount of investment in
one of them. It follows that:
 PD,PCx = k
PD,PC
8 I
PD,PC
x (4.23)
where 0 < kPD,PC8 < 1 are constants.
E↵ects of Successful Innovations
Successful innovations arrive with probability  . A firm that successfully introduces
a product innovation at time t immediately creates a new best-quality product with
QZ,x(t) = QZ,x(t  1)+QZ,x(t  1) Q. If the firm is already at the quality frontier, the
new product will also become the new global best-quality product. This new product
arrives with a lower production technology than the previous best-quality product21,
given by AZ,Q,x(t) = AZ,Q,x(t  1) AZ,Q,x(t  1)( A)PD and it starts with no learning-
by-doing experience and with ⌫Q = QZ,x. Finally, if the new product is indeed a new
global best-product with no competition still, firm decides to set its mark-up to the
maximum possible value, defined in the model as 0.3. Otherwise, the firm will set a
mark-up identical to the mean of the mark-ups of products with same quality in the
market.
A successful process innovation, on the other hand, increases the technology of pro-
duction of every product the firm is producing at the time of innovation by Az(t) =
Az(t   1)( APC). Process innovations, clearly, have a direct impact on products cost
and it is the only e↵ective way a firm can reduce a products price below a certain
threshold, given the presence of diminishing returns to learning-by-doing in the model.
4.3 Results
In this section results for di↵erent values of wealth inequality given by the Gini index
are presented. The values chosen for the Gini index are the real index values22 of Swe-
den (0.25), United States(0.41) and Brazil(0.53), representing countries with completely
disparate situations regarding inequality. 100 di↵erent simulation runs are performed
for each of the scenarios, totalling 300 simulations over a t = 2000 time period.
There are a couple of simple procedures that have to be made before the simulation
to ensure that our log-normal distribution yields the desired Gini values and, more
21Due to the firms lack of experience producing the new product.
22Source: OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
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importantly, that the mean wealth of consumers remains constant through all Gini
values tested and also through all simulations.
According to Yurko (2006) Gini index can be obtained by any log-normal CDF23 by
applying the following equation:
G = 1  1
w
Z 1
0
(1  F (w))2dw (4.24)
where G is the Gini index, w is the mean wealth of consumers and F(w) is the log-normal
CDF.
To e↵ectively keep the mean constant at all times, we take advantage in the fact that
log-normal distributions have both a location (µ) and a scale ( ) parameter. This way,
we can set the location parameter µ as a function of   in order to keep the mean of the
distribution constant. Using the expression for the mean of the log-normal distribution
it is straightforward to assume:
µ = lnw    
2
2
(4.25)
Throughout the simulations, it is thus assumed that the mean wealth of consumers
is constant and takes the value w = 2. Table 4.1 below brings the simulation values of
the other constants of the model.
Tabela 4.1: Model Constants
Constant Value Constant Value
Incumbents 5 Population 500
k0 0.001 k1 0.1
k2 0.05 k{3,..,6} 0.2
kPD7 0.01 k
PC
7 0.07
  0.1 ↵r 0.8
r 0.01 ↵m 0.5
( Q) 0.2 ↵p 0.2
( A)PC 0.044 ( A)PD 0.2
o 0.10 ◆ 0.15
4.3.1 Market Indicators
We begin by analysing market indicators. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below shows market
saturation and HHI for each of the inequality measures. We can clearly see that the
mean saturation between all the simulation runs is higher in the case of low inequa-
lity, confirming theoretical assumptions that new products di↵use faster in egalitarian
markets due to the smaller gap between rich and poor. Competition is also much more
favoured under low inequality than high inequality due to the higher maximum satura-
tion levels on each PLC fostered by longer periods of increasing profits before decreasing
that allows more firms to enter the market during each PLC.
23Cumulative Distribution Function
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Figura 4.3: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on Market Saturation
Figura 4.4: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
When inequality is high firms achieve their maximum profits from a product early in
the product life cycle and thus quickly starts to invest in product innovation to raise the
profits back up by introducing a new best-quality product to fulfil the needs of the rich.
Even thou total profits will be lower under high inequality, mark-ups, prices and profit-
margins will be higher due to the lack of competition. Note that process innovations
are not the only way to reduce prices in the market, which can also be done by reducing
mark-ups in face of severe competition what, according to the results of the model, is
much less intense in high inequality cases.
This problem is only worsen in societies with a small middle class where the gaps
between the rich and the poor makes heavy process innovation investments infeasible
since there is almost no one to hold demand in a steady growth while the firm makes
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the necessary technological improvements to be able to sell to the masses. Figures 4.5,
4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 below brings the results for the mean prices, mark-ups, profits and
profit-margins of the firms.
Figura 4.5: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on the Mean Price Charged by Firms
Figura 4.6: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on the Mean Mark-up of Firms
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Figura 4.7: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on the Mean Profit Obtained by Firms
Figura 4.8: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on the Mean Profit Margin of Firms
4.3.2 Innovation, Exclusion and Utility
Contrary to the theoretical assumptions of the aforementioned authors, results show
that both product and process innovations are much more common under low wealth
inequality situations. This means not only consumers will have cheaper products, but
also a bigger diversity and access to better quality goods, as we can see below. This
situation increases the options of consumption for all classes, considerably raising the
mean utility amongst consumers and reducing the exclusion of a larger part of the
population from the market of products with better quality.
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Figura 4.9: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on The Evolution of Product Quality
Figura 4.10: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on Product Diversity
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Figura 4.11: E↵ects of Wealth Inequality on Exclusion
Figura 4.12: E↵ects of Inequality on Mean Consumer Utility
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter we have developed an agent-based model in which heterogeneity in
wealth endowments shape consumers into di↵erent social classes that behave di↵erently
towards the adoption of new products. A degree of bandwagon behaviour, although
homogeneous amongst consumers, is maintained in the form of bounded rationality
using SPADA framework. Consumers have also a prolonged awareness that a↵ects their
utility decisions at each point in time by creating social pressures to follow the patterns
of consumption of the classes above their own.
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Results show that a more egalitarian society yields both product and process innova-
tion increases. As a dynamic model, results should be viewed as a never-ending process
of variables influencing one another. In this sense, it is advantageous to have an exo-
genously given wealth inequality so we are able to capture, and to impose, a beginning
to this process and see the pure e↵ects of inequality over the dynamics of the model. It
is safe to assume that equality, right from the first product life cycle, became to shape
a market with much more competition, leading firms to reduce their prices not only to
raise their profits capturing a larger demand, but by having to survive the competition
and reduce mark-ups. Even thou profit margins are lower with low inequality, firms are
probably better o↵ in this case, since total profits are still higher because of increased
demand.
The greater product diversity and lower exclusion also contributes for the firms to
get the best allocation of demand out of their products. A sign of this is that the mean
consumer utility is considerably higher with low inequality. Even rich individuals are in
a better situation24
Since there is no empirical confirmation of the model, we must be careful with our
statements. Given the pessimistic conclusions of recent empirical works on the e↵ects
of innovation on inequality, one might argue that the increase in innovations caused
by a more equal society could lead to rising inequality since entrepreneurs are making
a larger amount of total profits. This could result in inequality/innovation cycles, an
interesting subject for future research easily implemented in a model similar to this one,
but with endogenous income, a labour market and, more importantly, a financial market
to capture the idea that unequal societies remains unequal due to di↵erent propensities
to save between rich and poor.
24Note that there is any kind of Veblen or snob e↵ects in the model. Introducing them would probably
yield a negative e↵ect of equality on rich utility.
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Cap´ıtulo 5
Conclusion
Throughout the course of history mankind has evolved and introduced a countless
number of tangible and ethereal inventions and innovations that were key to define the
path of development and behaviour of the present era. The savage did raise from under
the tree and started to fulfil needs that, at each point in history, would be unimaginable
in previous eras. Wants, arising out of survival necessity or pure lust, are tied together
with technological change in a never-ending co-evolution process accelerated by the
mesmerizing fact that human beings e↵ectively learned how to create the most diverse
types of wants in order to keep the wheels of evolution turning, whether its grease is
called growth or development.
Despite the craving need to conform with the ones around us, be the standard
enforced by law or a social convention necessary for one to be accepted in a group,
each item on the set of human individuals, as the name suggests, behave di↵erently and
should not be view from afar as homogeneous, but with a magnifying glass, specially
in economics. It is fairly common to hear people saying that we are approaching a
robotic state in which everyone thinks and behaves exactly the same as we were all
slaves of machinery like in Fritz Lang Metropolis. Notwithstanding the abysmal rotten
intolerance and the lingering misery still present in our world we are probably doing much
better than most generations that have preceded us. Freedom of speech and behaviour
and the diversity of wants are certainly on the rise in developed and developing countries.
It seems that scarcity, once economists biggest concern, is definitely being replaced by
distribution.
The most recent take-o↵ on the speed of agent interaction caused by the invention of
the internet and globalization makes bandwagon behaviour even more important to un-
derstand the patterns of consumption in our society. Nowadays, products and ideas can
be di↵used or totally shoved in a matter of minutes because the edges that connect us
have multiplied and every single node of us is entitled with a respect deserving opinion.
Individual awareness and access to information has certainly increased, despite of the
higher error functions caused by a huge part of this information being untrustworthy.
Nevertheless, individuals of all classes have now easier access to new products and tech-
nologies and thus are inclined to try to pursue consumption patterns from individuals
with higher wealth and income. It seems reasonable to suggest that economists and
public managers should work to responsibly guarantee that the poor also have access to
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fulfilling their most diverse needs, specially basic ones, but also to follow a bandwagon
of modernity and pleasure.
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Appendix A
Chapter 3 Variables Description
Tabela A.1: Brief Description of Chapter 3 Variables
Variable Description
⌦ Set of all consumers in the model
!i A given consumer in the model
  Stochastic bandwagon threshold of consumers
  Bi-dimensional wrapped plain characterizing the economic space of the model
⇤ Awareness of consumers (constant in this model)
z Denotes a product
Z Denotes the best-quality product in the market
  The set of all products in the market
q Denotes the quality of a product
Q Denotes the quality of the best-quality product in the market
x A given firm in the model
⇢ Price paid by a consumer for a given product
⇥i Neighbouring set of a given consumer in the model
 z Subset of consumers who already adopted a given product at time t
 i Product supplier of a given consumer
e Total e↵ort spent by a consumer to buy a given product
di,x Distance of a consumer from a given firm
⌅i Set of firms that can influence a given consumer
p Denotes the price charged by a firm
F Set of firms in the economy
r Interest rate
S Market or product saturation
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
msx Market-share of a given firm
⇡x Profit of a given firm
Dx Demand of a given firm
cx Cost of a given firm
I Investment
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Tabela A.1: Brief Description of Chapter 3 Variables
Variable Description
  Probability of arrival of an innovation
µ Denotes Mark-up
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Code
breed [firms firm]
breed [consumers consumer]
breed [halos halo]
directed-link-breed [halos-links halo-link]
undirected-link-breed [deals-links deal-link]
globals
[
hhi
tprofit
mprofit
saturation
dead-consumers
best-quality
quality-list
inn_happen
tchange
test?
innsat
hight-profit
lowt-profit
diff-profit
]
firms-own
[
profit
profitr-h
profit-rate
demand
quality
cost
fcost
vcost
market-share
ms-history
price
age
r&d-percent
r&d-invest
r&d-prod
r&d-proc
r&d-tot
mark-up
my-sat
investment
resources
pinnova?
change-ms?
]
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consumers-own
[
profile
bandwagon
client?
vision
price-paid
quality-owned
my-provider
prob-change
buy-distance
effort
]
;;SETUP PROCEDURES;;
to setup
ca
setup-firms
setup-consumers
set-default-shape halos "thin circle"
set best-quality 15
set hhi 1
set inn_happen 0
set tchange 0
set test? false
let bt best-quality
set quality-list (list (bt))
set innsat 0
reset-ticks
end
to setup-firms
create-firms incumbents
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set shape "factory"
set size 1.5
set age 1
set quality 15
set color quality
set demand 0
set cost 1
set mark-up 0.2
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up)) ;{mark-up rule}
set profit 0
set profit-rate 0
set market-share (1 / incumbents)
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history (list (ms-now))
let profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h (list (profit-now))
set my-sat 0
set investment 100
set resources investment
set r&d-invest 0
set r&d-tot 0
set r&d-prod 0
set r&d-proc 0
set r&d-percent 0
set pinnova? false
set change-ms? false
]
end
to setup-consumers
create-consumers newcomers
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set bandwagon 0.5
set color white
set shape "person"
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set size 1
set vision awareness
set client? false
set my-provider nobody
set price-paid 1000
set quality-owned 5
set prob-change 0
set buy-distance 1000
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance * distance-weight)
]
let t ((count consumers) * (techies / newcomers))
let v ((count consumers) * (visionaries / newcomers))
let p ((count consumers) * (pragmatists / newcomers))
let c ((count consumers) * (conservatives / newcomers))
let s ((count consumers) - c - p - v - t)
ask n-of t consumers with [bandwagon = 0.5]
[
set bandwagon 1
set profile "qualityy"
set my-provider firm 0
set price-paid 1.2
set quality-owned 15
set color red
create-deal-link-with firm 0
ask my-deals-links
[
set color 2
]
set client? true
set buy-distance (distance-weight * distance firm 0)
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance * distance-weight)
]
ask n-of v consumers with [bandwagon = 0.5]
[
set bandwagon 0.8
set profile "visionary"
]
ask n-of p consumers with [bandwagon = 0.5]
[
set bandwagon 0.6
set profile "pragmatist"
]
ask n-of c consumers with [bandwagon = 0.5]
[
set bandwagon 0.4
set profile "conservative"
]
ask n-of s consumers with [bandwagon = 0.5]
[
set bandwagon 0.2
set profile "skeptic"
]
end
to go
move-consumers
become-client
set-best-quality
change-quality-owned
change-provider
set-market-share
change-prices
check-demand
check-profits
set-saturation
set-hhi
set-r&dinvest
process-innovate
product-innovate
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check-change
set-saturation
entry
exit
high-low-profits
ask consumers with [client? = true]
[
set buy-distance distance my-provider
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance * distance-weight)
set prob-change 0
]
ask firms
[
let tquality quality
set my-sat (count consumers with [quality-owned = tquality]) / (count consumers)
set size 1.5 + (0.1 * count my-deals-links)
set age age + 1
let my-quality quality
ifelse hhi > 0.5
[
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
]
[
set price ( (0.6 * (cost + (cost * mark-up))) + (0.4 * (mean [price] of firms with [quality =
my-quality])))
let c-price price
if any? my-deals-links
[
ask my-deals-links
[
ask other-end
[
set price-paid c-price
]]]]]
if ticks = 2000
[
stop
]
if not any? firms
[
stop
]
tick
end
;;CONSUMER PROCEDURES::
to move-consumers
ask consumers
[
set heading random 360
forward 1
]
end
to become-client
ask consumers
[
foreach sort consumers
[
if client? = false
[
if any? firms in-radius awareness
[
let pot-quality sort-on [price] firms in-radius awareness
let chosen-price [price] of first pot-quality
let chosen-quality [quality] of first pot-quality
let chosen-provider item 0 pot-quality
let chosen-color [color] of first pot-quality
if random-float 1 < bandwagon
[
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set my-provider chosen-provider
set price-paid chosen-price
set quality-owned chosen-quality
set color chosen-color
set prob-change 0
create-deal-link-with my-provider
ask my-deals-links
[
set color 2
]
set client? true
set buy-distance (distance-weight * distance my-provider)
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance)]
]]]]
end
to change-quality-owned
ask consumers
[
let my-quality-owned quality-owned
if any? consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned > my-quality-owned]
[
let count-neighbors count consumers in-radius awareness
let cn-quality count consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned > my-quality-owned]
let cn-percent (cn-quality / count-neighbors)
set prob-change ( bandwagon * ((alpha * cn-quality) + ((1 - alpha) * cn-percent )))
let cn-quality-list sort-on [price-paid] consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned >
my-quality-owned]
let new-quality [quality-owned] of first cn-quality-list
let new-provider [my-provider] of first cn-quality-list
let new-price-paid [price-paid] of first cn-quality-list
if random-float 10 < prob-change
[
set price-paid new-price-paid
set quality-owned new-quality
set my-provider new-provider
set prob-change 0
set color quality-owned
ask my-deals-links
[
die
]
create-deal-link-with my-provider
ask my-deals-links
[
set color 2
]
set client? true
set buy-distance (distance-weight * distance my-provider)
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance)]]
if any? firms in-radius awareness with [quality > my-quality-owned]
[
let pot-price sort [price] of firms in-radius awareness with [quality > my-quality-owned]
let best-price min pot-price
let pot-quality sort-on [price] firms in-radius awareness with [quality > my-quality-owned]
let chosen-quality [quality] of first pot-quality
let pot-provider item 0 pot-quality
let chosen-color [color] of first pot-quality
if random-float 1 < bandwagon
[
set color chosen-color
set quality-owned chosen-quality
set my-provider pot-provider
set prob-change 0
set price-paid best-price
ask my-deals-links
[
die
]
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create-deal-link-with my-provider
ask my-deals-links
[
set color 2
]
set client? true
set buy-distance (distance-weight * distance my-provider)
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance)]
]]
end
to change-provider
ask consumers
[
if client? = true
[
let my-quality-owned quality-owned
if not any? consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned > my-quality-owned]
[
if any? consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned = my-quality-owned]
[
let count-neighbors count consumers in-radius awareness
let cn-price count consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned = my-quality-owned]
let cn-percent (cn-price / count-neighbors)
set prob-change ( bandwagon * ((alpha * cn-price) + ((1 - alpha) * cn-percent )))
let current-effort effort
let pot-effort sort-on [effort] consumers in-radius awareness with [quality-owned =
my-quality-owned]
let p-effort [effort] of first pot-effort
if p-effort < current-effort
[
let new-provider [my-provider] of first pot-effort
let new-price-paid [price-paid] of first pot-effort
if random-float 1 < prob-change
[
set my-provider new-provider
set price-paid new-price-paid
set prob-change 0
ask my-deals-links
[
die
]
create-deal-link-with my-provider
ask my-deals-links
[
set color 2
]
set client? true
set buy-distance (distance-weight * distance my-provider)
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance)
]]]]]]
end
to diffuse-quality
ask consumers with [profile = "qualityy"]
[
if my-provider != nobody
[
let x-quality [quality] of my-provider
let x-color [color] of my-provider
let my-quality-owned quality-owned
if x-quality > my-quality-owned
[
set quality-owned x-quality
set color x-color
]]]
end
;;FIRMS PROCEDURES;;;
to set-market-share
ask firms
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[
if any? deals-links
[
let n-links count my-deals-links
let total-pop count consumers with [client? = true]
let ms-temp (n-links / total-pop)
if market-share != ms-temp
[
set market-share ms-temp
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history fput ms-now ms-history
]]]
end
to change-prices
ask firms
[
if length ms-history > 10
[
let ms-h ms-history
let ms-0 item 0 ms-h
let ms-1 item 1 ms-h
let ms-2 item 2 ms-h
let ms-3 item 3 ms-h
let ms-4 item 4 ms-h
if ms-0 < ms-1
[
if ms-1 < ms-2
[
if ms-2 < ms-3
[
set mark-up (mark-up - (mark-up * p-reaction))
let my-quality quality
set price ( (0.6 * (cost + (cost * mark-up))) + (0.4 * (mean [price] of firms with [quality
= my-quality]))) ; swedish paper % of firms that set prices by mark-up and by mean
let c-price price
set ms-history (list(ms-0))
if any? my-deals-links
[
ask my-deals-links
[
ask other-end
[
set price-paid c-price
]]]]]]
if ms-0 > ms-1
[
if ms-1 < ms-2
[
if ms-2 < ms-3
[
set mark-up (mark-up + (mark-up * p-reaction))
set ms-history (list(ms-0))
let c-price price
if any? my-deals-links
[
ask my-deals-links
[
ask other-end
[
set price-paid c-price]]]]]]]]
end
to check-demand
ask firms
[
set demand count my-deals-links
]
end
to check-profits
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ask firms
[ let demand-now count my-deals-links
set profit (demand * (price - cost))
set profit-rate (profit / investment)
let profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h fput profit-now profitr-h
]
end
to entry
if any? firms with [quality = best-quality]
[
ask one-of firms with [quality = best-quality]
[
let mean-profits mean [profit-rate] of firms with [ quality = best-quality]
let mean-costs mean [cost] of firms with [ quality = best-quality]
let mean-mark-up mean [mark-up] of firms with [ quality = best-quality]
if mean-profits > (interest + op-cost)
[
if saturation < 0.5
[
if random-float 1 < (prob-entry * hhi)
[
hatch-firms 1
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set shape "factory"
set size 1.5
set age 1
set quality best-quality
set color best-quality
set cost mean-costs
set mark-up (mean-mark-up - (p-reaction * mean-mark-up))
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
set market-share (0)
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history (list (ms-now))
set my-sat 0
set investment 100
set resources investment
set pinnova? false
set change-ms? false
set r&d-proc 0
set r&d-prod 0
]]
]]]]
end
to exit
ask firms
[
if length profitr-h > 100
[
let list-profit sublist profitr-h 0 101
let sum-profit sum list-profit
let mn-profit (sum-profit / 100)
if mn-profit < interest
[
if any? my-deals-links
[
ask my-deals-links
[
ask other-end
[
set client? false
set color white
set my-provider nobody
set price-paid 100000
set quality-owned 5
set prob-change 0
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set buy-distance 1000
set effort (price-paid + buy-distance * distance-weight)
]
die
]]
die
]]]
end
to set-R&dinvest
ask firms
[
let sat my-sat
let herf (1 - (sum [market-share * market-share] of firms))
let new-rdsat (k4 * ( 1 - e ^ ( - k5 * sat))) ;;; Saviotti & Pyka (2012)
let new-rdhhi (k4 * ( 1 - e ^ ( - k5 * herf)))
set r&d-percent (new-rdsat + new-rdhhi)
set r&d-invest (r&d-percent * profit)
set profit profit - r&d-invest
ifelse my-sat > (1 - hhi)
[
if my-sat > 0.5
[
set r&d-prod (r&d-prod + r&d-invest)
]]
[
set r&d-proc (r&d-proc + r&d-invest)
]
]
end
to product-innovate
ask firms
[
let r&d-pd r&d-prod
if my-sat > (1 - hhi)
[
if my-sat > 0.5
[
set pinnova? true
if pinnova? = true
[
if random-float 10 < (k8 * r&d-pd)
[
set innsat saturation
let old-quality quality
set quality quality + 10
let new-quality quality
set color color + 10
let col color
set r&d-prod 0
set cost (cost + (0.2 * cost))
ask my-deals-links
[
ask other-end
[
if profile = "qualityy"
[
set quality-owned new-quality
set color col
]
]
]
set pinnova? false
]]]]]
end
to process-innovate
ask firms
[
let r&d-pc r&d-proc
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if my-sat <= (1 - hhi)
[
if random-float 10 < (k9 * r&d-pc)
[
set r&d-proc 0
set cost (cost - (0.044 * cost))
]]]
end
;;GLOBAL PROCEDURES;;
to set-best-quality
let bt sort-by > [quality] of firms
let bt1 item 0 bt
set quality-list fput bt1 quality-list
set best-quality first bt
end
to check-change
let total-pop count consumers
let quality-pop count consumers with [quality-owned = (best-quality - 10)]
set innsat (quality-pop / total-pop)
set tchange 0
let bt sort-by > [quality] of firms
let btl length quality-list
if btl > 1
[
let bt0 item 0 quality-list
let bt1 item 1 quality-list
if test? = false
[
if bt0 > bt1
[
set tchange 1
set test? true
]]
if bt0 <= bt1
[
set test? false]
]
end
to set-saturation
let total-pop count consumers
let quality-pop count consumers with [quality-owned = best-quality]
set saturation (quality-pop / total-pop)
end
to set-hhi
set hhi sum [market-share * market-share] of firms
end
to high-low-profits
if any? firms with [quality != best-quality and age > 50]
[
if any? firms with [quality = best-quality and age > 50]
[
set hight-profit mean [profit] of firms with [quality = best-quality and age > 50]
set lowt-profit mean [profit] of firms with [quality != best-quality and age > 50]
set diff-profit (hight-profit - lowt-profit)
]]
end
to make-halo
hatch-halos 1
[ set size (2 * awareness)
set color lput 64 extract-rgb color
__set-line-thickness 0.5
create-halo-link-from myself
[ tie
hide-link ] ]
end
;;Code by Einloft, P. ; Pereima, J.B.;;
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Appendix C
Chapter 4 Variables Description
Tabela C.1: Brief Description of Chapter 4 Variables
Variable Description
⌦ Set of all consumers in the model
  Stochastic bandwagon threshold of consumers
  Bi-dimensional wrapped plain characterizing the economic space of the model
⇤ Awareness of consumers (constant in this model)
E Prolonged awareness procedure
w Denotes wealth
⌘ Parameter of wealth PDF
  Parameter of wealth PDF
⇣ Standard normal variable
↵ Captures consumer preferences given their social status
⌫ Denotes perceived-quality
t Denotes time
⌧ Denotes the age of a product
  Reference price of consumers
A Technology of a product
◆ Parameter controlling the speed of learning-by-doing
  Forgetting rate (memory loss) of consumers
⇧ Denotes profit
# Size of the period analysed by the firm to make the innovation type decision
z Denotes a product
Z Denotes the best-quality product in the market
  The set of all products in the market
q Denotes the quality of a product
Q Denotes the quality of the best-quality product in the market
x A given firm in the model
⇥i Neighbouring set of a given consumer in the model
 z Subset of consumers who already adopted a given product at time t
di,x Distance of a consumer from a given firm
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Tabela C.1: Brief Description of Chapter 4 Variables
Variable Description
p Denotes the price charged by a firm
⌅ Set of firms in the economy
r Interest rate
S Market or product saturation
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
msx Market-share of a given firm
⇡x Profit of a given firm
Dx Demand of a given firm
cx Cost of a given firm
I Investment
  Probability of arrival of an innovation
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Appendix D
Chapter 4 code
extensions [numanal]
breed [firms firm]
breed [consumers consumer]
breed [products product]
directed-link-breed [fipro-links fp-link ]
undirected-link-breed [copro-links copro-link]
globals
[
hhi
saturation
best-quality
quality-list
gini-index-reserve
lorenz-points
best-color
pond-profits
profit-list
derivative-list
profit-tendency
diversity
product-innovations
process-innovations
exclusion
]
turtles-own
[
age
]
firms-own
[
firm-profit
firm-profitr-h
firm-profit-rate
firm-best-quality
total-cost
market-share
ms-history
r&d-percent
r&d-invest
r&d-prod
r&d-proc
r&d-tot
my-sat
investment
pinnova?
firm-profit-margin
firm-quality
firm-demand
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]
consumers-own
[
client?
vision
price-paid
quality-owned
wealth
products-known
my-product
class
my-utility
perc-quality-owned
bandwagon
cdf
erf
prolongaware
pa-list
]
products-own
[
price
quality
cost
base-cost
profit
profit-rate
profitr-h
profit-margin
mark-up
demand
perceived-quality
technology
productivity
prod-market-share
prod-ms-history
prod-invest
poor-utility
middle-utility
rich-utility
version-age
]
;;SETUP PROCEDURES
to setup
ca
setup-consumers
set best-quality 5
set quality-list []
set hhi 1 / incumbents
ask consumers
[
let ww sort-by < [wealth] of consumers
let pt abs (0.6 * newcomers)
let mt abs (0.95 * newcomers)
let pt2 item pt ww
let mt2 item mt ww
if wealth < pt2
[
set class "poor"
set shape "middles"
]
if wealth >= pt2 and wealth < mt2
[
set class "middle"
set shape "middles"
]
if wealth >= mt2
[
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set class "rich"
set shape "riches"
]
]
ask turtles
[
set age 1
]
setup-firms
set profit-list [0]
set derivative-list [0]
set profit-tendency 1
set product-innovations 0
set process-innovations 0
reset-ticks
end
to setup-firms
create-firms incumbents
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set shape "factory"
set size 2
set age 1
set color 15
set firm-profit 0
set firm-profit-rate 0
set market-share (1 / incumbents)
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history (list (ms-now))
let profit-now firm-profit-rate
set firm-profitr-h (list (profit-now))
set my-sat 0
set investment 100
set r&d-invest 0
set r&d-tot 0
set r&d-prod 0
set r&d-proc 0
set r&d-percent 0
set pinnova? false
hatch-products 1
[
set shape "line half"
set color 15
set size 3
set heading 0
set base-cost min [wealth] of consumers with [class = "rich"]
set cost base-cost
set demand 0
set mark-up 0.3
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
set quality 5
set perceived-quality quality
set technology 1
set productivity 1
set age 1
set profit 0
set profit-rate 0
let prod-profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h (list (prod-profit-now))
set profit-margin 0
set prod-market-share (1 / incumbents)
let p-ms-now prod-market-share
set prod-ms-history (list (p-ms-now))
set prod-invest 100
set version-age 1
]
]
end
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to setup-consumers
create-consumers newcomers
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set color white
set size 1
let u random-float 1
let a (1 + gini) / (2 * gini)
let h maxwealth
let l minwealth
let b 5
let k parameter-k-weibull
let rn random-normal 0 1
let mi (ln media - ((phi ^ 2) / 2))
;set wealth (mm / (random-float 1 ^ (1 / a)));
ifelse use-pareto? = true
[
;set wealth ( - (((u * h ^ a) - (u * l ^ a) - (h ^ a)) / ((h ^ a) * (l ^ a)))) ^ ( - 1 / a)
let m Xm
set wealth (xm / (u ^ (1 / a)))
]
[
;set wealth (b * ( - ln u)^(1 / k))
;if wealth < 1
;[
; set wealth 1
;]
set wealth (1 + e ^ (mi + (phi * rn)))
]
set products-known []
set my-utility 0
set client? false
set perc-quality-owned 0
set price-paid 1000
set quality-owned 0
set my-product nobody
set prolongaware 0
set pa-list [0]
]
update-lorenz-and-gini
end
to go
move-consumers
know-products
buy
update-perceived-quality
update-cost
update-price
update-class-utility
update-demand
update-profit
update-prod-market-share
update-mark-up
update-consumer-variables
update-market-share
set-firm-my-sat-and-quality
set-firm-profits
set-best-quality
set-hhi
set-saturation
set-R&dinvest
process-innovate
product-innovate
products-shutdown
calculate-pond-profits
check-diversity-exclusion
entry
exit
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ask turtles
[
set age age + 1
]
ask products
[
set version-age version-age + 1
]
if ticks >= 2000
[
stop
]
tick
end
;;CONSUMER PROCEDURES;;
to move-consumers
ask consumers
[
set heading random 360
forward speed
]
end
to know-products
ask consumers
[
let w wealth
if any? products in-radius awareness with [ price <= w]
[
let pproduct one-of products in-radius awareness with [ price <= w]
let p-known products-known
if random-float 1 < k0
[
if member? pproduct p-known = false
[
set products-known lput pproduct products-known
]]]
if any? consumers in-radius awareness with [client? = true and price-paid <= w]
[
let pconsumer one-of consumers in-radius awareness with [client? = true and price-paid <= w]
let pconsprod [my-product] of pconsumer
let pc-known products-known
if random-float 1 < k1
[
if member? pconsprod pc-known = false
[
set products-known lput pconsprod products-known
]]]]
end
to buy
ask consumers with [class = "poor"]
[
if length products-known > 0
[
let w wealth
let pa prolongaware
let palist pa-list
let candidates products-known
let paw-products sort-on [poorw-utility - (distance myself * poor-dist-weight) + pa] products with
[member? self palist = true and price < w]
let best-product2 sort-on [poorw-utility - (distance myself * poor-dist-weight)] products with
[member? self candidates = true and price < w]
foreach paw-products [ set best-product2 lput ? best-product2]
let best-product reverse best-product2
if length best-product > 0
[
let bp item 0 best-product
let q [quality] of first best-product
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let pq [perceived-quality] of first best-product
let p [price] of first best-product
let u2 [poorw-utility - (distance myself * poor-dist-weight)] of first best-product
if u2 > my-utility
[
ask my-copro-links
[
die
]
create-copro-link-with bp
[
set color 3
set hidden? true
]
set my-utility u2
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
set perc-quality-owned pq
set my-product bp
set client? true
set color [color] of my-product
]]]]
ask consumers with [class = "middle"]
[
if length products-known > 0
[
let w wealth
let pa prolongaware
let palist pa-list
let candidates products-known
let paw-products sort-on [middlew-utility - (distance myself * others-dist-weight) + pa] products
with [member? self palist = true and price < w]
let best-product2 sort-on [middlew-utility - (distance myself * others-dist-weight)] products with
[member? self candidates = true and price < w]
foreach paw-products [ set best-product2 lput ? best-product2]
let best-product reverse best-product2
if length best-product > 0
[
let bp item 0 best-product
let q [quality] of first best-product
let pq [perceived-quality] of first best-product
let p [price] of first best-product
let u2 [middlew-utility - (distance myself * others-dist-weight)] of first best-product
if u2 > my-utility
[
ask my-copro-links
[
die
]
create-copro-link-with bp
[
set color 3
]
set my-utility u2
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
set perc-quality-owned pq
set my-product bp
set client? true
set color [color] of my-product
]]]]
ask consumers with [class = "rich"]
[
if length products-known > 0
[
let w wealth
let candidates products-known
let best-product2 sort-on [richw-utility - (distance myself * others-dist-weight)] products with
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[member? self candidates = true and price < w]
let best-product reverse best-product2
if length best-product > 0
[
let bp item 0 best-product
let q [quality] of first best-product
let pq [perceived-quality] of first best-product
let p [price] of first best-product
let u2 [richw-utility - (distance myself * others-dist-weight)] of first best-product
if u2 > my-utility
[
ask my-copro-links
[
die
]
create-copro-link-with bp
[
set color 3
]
set my-utility u2
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
set perc-quality-owned pq
set my-product bp
set client? true
set color [color] of my-product
]]]]
end
to update-consumer-variables
ask products
[
let pq perceived-quality
let q quality
let p price
let up poorw-utility
let um middlew-utility
let ur richw-utility
ask my-copro-links
[
ask other-end
[
if class = "poor"
[
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
let d (distance my-product) * poor-dist-weight
set my-utility up - d
set perc-quality-owned pq
]
if class = "middle"
[
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
let d (distance my-product) * others-dist-weight
set my-utility um - d
set perc-quality-owned pq
]
if class = "rich"
[
set price-paid p
set quality-owned q
let d (distance my-product) * others-dist-weight
set my-utility ur - d
set perc-quality-owned pq
]
]]]
end
93
to prolong-awareness
ask consumers with [class = "poor"]
[
let v perc-quality-owned
if any? consumers in-radius awareness with [perc-quality-owned > v and class = "middle"]
[
let cv sort [my-product] of consumers in-radius awareness with [perc-quality-owned > v and class =
"middle"]
let cv2 length cv
set prolongaware prolongaware + cv2 - (0.5 * prolongaware)
let pa prolongaware
let pl pa-list
foreach cv [set pl lput ? pl]
set pa-list pl
]]
ask consumers with [class = "middle"]
[
let v perc-quality-owned
if any? consumers in-radius awareness with [perc-quality-owned > v and class = "rich"]
[
let cv sort [my-product] of consumers in-radius awareness with [perc-quality-owned > v and class =
"rich"]
let cv2 length cv
set prolongaware prolongaware + cv2 - (0.5 * prolongaware)
let pa prolongaware
let pl pa-list
foreach cv [set pl lput ? pl]
set pa-list pl
]]
end
;;PRODUCT PROCEDURES;;
to update-class-utility
ask products
[
set poor-utility (perceived-quality ^ p-quality) + (price ^ (p-quality - 1))
set middle-utility (perceived-quality ^ m-quality) + (price ^ (m-quality - 1))
set rich-utility (perceived-quality ^ r-quality) + (price ^ (r-quality - 1))
]
end
to update-perceived-quality
ask products
[
if 2 > (age ^ ( obs-rate))
[
set perceived-quality (quality * (age ^ ( - obs-rate) + (e ^ kk * (price - 1))))
]]
end
to update-cost
ask products
[
if price > min [wealth] of consumers
[
let a version-age
if ((a ^ ( - learning-by-doing)) > (technology - 1))
[
let cost-impact ((a ^ ( - learning-by-doing)) - (technology - 1))
set productivity (1 / cost-impact)
set cost (base-cost * (cost-impact))
]]]
end
to update-price
ask products
[
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
]
end
to update-demand
ask products
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[
set demand count my-copro-links
]
end
to update-profit
ask products
[
set profit (demand * (price - cost))
set profit-rate (profit / prod-invest)
let profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h fput profit-now profitr-h
if demand > 0
[
set profit-margin (profit / demand)
]]
end
to update-prod-market-share
ask products
[
let q quality
let total-d count consumers with [quality-owned = q]
if any? consumers with [quality-owned = q]
[
let ms-temp (demand / total-d)
if prod-market-share != ms-temp
[
set prod-market-share ms-temp
let prod-ms-now prod-market-share
set prod-ms-history fput prod-ms-now prod-ms-history
]]]
end
to update-mark-up
ask products
[
if length prod-ms-history > 10
[
let ms-h prod-ms-history
let ms-0 item 0 ms-h
let ms-1 item 1 ms-h
let ms-2 item 2 ms-h
let ms-3 item 3 ms-h
let ms-4 item 4 ms-h
if ms-0 < ms-1
[
if ms-1 < ms-2
[
if ms-2 < ms-3
[
set mark-up (mark-up - (mark-up * p-reaction))
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
let c-price price
set prod-ms-history (list(ms-0))
if any? my-copro-links
[
ask my-copro-links
[
ask other-end
[
set price-paid c-price
]]]]]]
if ms-0 > ms-1
[
if ms-1 > ms-2
[
if ms-2 > ms-3
[
set mark-up (mark-up + (mark-up * p-reaction))
set prod-ms-history (list(ms-0))
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set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
let c-price price
if any? my-copro-links
[
ask my-copro-links
[
ask other-end
[
set price-paid c-price
]]]]]]]]
end
to products-shutdown
ask products
[
if length profitr-h > 250
[
let list-profit sublist profitr-h 0 101
let sum-profit sum list-profit
let mn-profit (sum-profit / 100)
if mn-profit < interest-rate
[
if any? my-copro-links
[
ask my-copro-links
[
ask other-end
[
set my-utility 0
set client? false
set perc-quality-owned 0
set price-paid 1000
set quality-owned 0
set my-product nobody
]
die
]]
die
]]]
end
;;FIRMS PROCEDURES;;
to update-market-share
ask firms
[
let my-demand sum [demand] of products-here
if any? consumers with [client? = true]
[
let total-d count consumers with [client? = true]
let ms-temp (my-demand / total-d)
if market-share != ms-temp
[
set market-share ms-temp
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history fput ms-now ms-history
]]]
end
to set-firm-my-sat-and-quality
ask firms
[
let xx sort-on [quality] products-here
if length xx > 0
[
let x reverse xx
let fb item 0 x
let fb2 [quality] of fb
let fbc [color] of fb
set my-sat (count consumers with [quality-owned = fb2]) / (count consumers)
set firm-quality fb2
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set color fbc
]]
end
to set-firm-profits
ask firms
[
set firm-profit sum [profit] of products-here
set investment sum [prod-invest] of products-here
set firm-profit-rate (firm-profit / investment)
let profit-now firm-profit-rate
set firm-profitr-h fput profit-now firm-profitr-h
set firm-demand sum [demand] of products-here
if firm-demand > 0
[
set firm-profit-margin (firm-profit / firm-demand)
set size 2 + (0.03 * firm-demand)
]]
end
to set-R&dinvest
ask firms
[
let sat my-sat
let herf (1 - (sum [market-share * market-share] of firms))
let new-rdsat (k4 * ( 1 - e ^ ( - k5 * sat)))
let new-rdhhi (k4 * ( 1 - e ^ ( - k5 * herf)))
set r&d-percent (new-rdsat + new-rdhhi)
set r&d-invest (r&d-percent * firm-profit)
set firm-profit firm-profit - r&d-invest
ifelse profit-tendency = 0
[set r&d-prod (r&d-prod + r&d-invest)]
[set r&d-proc (r&d-proc + r&d-invest)]
]
end
to product-innovate
ask firms
[
let r&d-pd r&d-prod
if profit-tendency = 0
[
set pinnova? true
if pinnova? = true
[
if random-float 10 < (k8 * r&d-pd)
[
let qq firm-quality
let cc color
set color color + 10
let col color
set r&d-prod 0
set product-innovations product-innovations + 1
hatch-products 1
[
set color col
set size 3
set shape "line half"
let head sort-by > [heading] of products-here
let head2 item 0 head
set heading head2 + 20
set base-cost min [wealth] of consumers with [class = "rich"]
set cost base-cost
set demand 0
set mark-up 0.3
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
set quality (qq + (qq * 0.2))
let qqq quality
set perceived-quality quality
set technology 1
set productivity 1
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set age 1
set version-age [version-age] of one-of products with [quality = qqq]
set profit 0
set profit-rate 0
let prod-profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h (list (prod-profit-now))
set profit-margin 0
set prod-market-share 1
let p-ms-now prod-market-share
set prod-ms-history (list (p-ms-now))
set prod-invest 100
]
]
set pinnova? false
]]]
end
to process-innovate
ask firms
[
let r&d-pc r&d-proc
let fq firm-quality
if my-sat <= (1 - hhi)
[
if random-float 10 < (k9 * r&d-pc)
[
set r&d-proc 0
set process-innovations process-innovations + 1
ask products-here
[
if price > min [wealth] of consumers
[
set technology (technology + (technology * 0.01))
]]]]]
end
to entry
if any? firms with [firm-quality = best-quality]
[
ask one-of firms with [firm-quality = best-quality]
[
if any? products with [quality = best-quality]
[
let mean-profits mean [profit-rate] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let mean-mark-up mean [mark-up] of products with [ quality = best-quality]
if mean-profits > (interest-rate)
[
if saturation < 0.5
[
if random-float 1 < (prob-entry * hhi)
[
hatch-firms 1
[
setxy random-xcor random-ycor
set shape "factory"
set size 2
set age 1
set color best-color
set firm-profit 0
set firm-profit-rate 0
set market-share 0
let ms-now market-share
set ms-history (list (ms-now))
let profit-now firm-profit-rate
set firm-profitr-h (list (profit-now))
set my-sat 0
set investment 100
set r&d-invest 0
set r&d-tot 0
set r&d-prod 0
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set r&d-proc 0
set r&d-percent 0
set pinnova? false
let meancost mean [cost] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let meanpq mean [perceived-quality] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let meanva mean [version-age] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let meanmkup mean [mark-up] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let meantech mean [technology] of products with [quality = best-quality]
hatch-products 1
[
set color best-color
set size 3
set shape "line half"
set heading 0
set base-cost min [wealth] of consumers with [class = "rich"]
set quality best-quality
let mq quality
set version-age meanva
set perceived-quality meanpq
set technology meantech
let a version-age
let cost-impact ((a ^ ( - learning-by-doing)) - (technology - 1))
set productivity (1 / cost-impact)
set cost (base-cost * (cost-impact))
set demand 0
set mark-up meanmkup
set price (cost + (cost * mark-up))
set age 1
set profit 0
set profit-rate 0
let prod-profit-now profit-rate
set profitr-h (list (prod-profit-now))
set profit-margin 0
set prod-market-share 0
let p-ms-now prod-market-share
set prod-ms-history (list (p-ms-now))
set prod-invest 100
]]]]]]]]
end
to exit
ask firms
[
if length firm-profitr-h > 200
[
let list-profit sublist firm-profitr-h 0 101
let sum-profit sum list-profit
let mn-profit (sum-profit / 100)
if mn-profit < interest-rate
[
if any? products-here
[
ask products-here
[
ask my-copro-links
[
ask other-end
[
set my-utility 0
set client? false
set perc-quality-owned 0
set price-paid 1000
set quality-owned 0
set my-product nobody
]
die
]
die
]]
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die
]]]
end
;;GLOBAL PROCEDURES;;
to set-best-quality
let bq sort-by > [quality] of products
let col sort-on [quality] products
let bq1 first bq
set quality-list fput bq1 quality-list
set best-quality first bq
set best-color [color] of last col
end
to set-saturation
let total-pop count consumers
let qual-pop count consumers with [quality-owned = best-quality]
set saturation (qual-pop / total-pop)
end
to set-hhi
set hhi sum [market-share * market-share] of firms
end
to calculate-pond-profits
if saturation > 0
[
let numerator sum [profit * demand] of products with [quality = best-quality]
let denominator sum [demand] of products with [quality = best-quality]
if denominator > 0
[
set pond-profits numerator / denominator
let pp pond-profits
set profit-list fput pp profit-list
]]
if length profit-list > 3
[
let x0 item 0 profit-list
let x1 item 1 profit-list
let derivative (x0 - x1)
set derivative-list fput derivative derivative-list
]
if length derivative-list > 100
[
let subd sublist derivative-list 1 101
let reduc reduce + subd
ifelse reduc > 0
[set profit-tendency 1]
[set profit-tendency 0]
]
end
to check-diversity-exclusion
let col [color] of consumers
let col2 remove-duplicates col
set diversity length col2
set exclusion count consumers with [quality-owned != best-quality]
end
;;REPORTERS;;
to-report poorw-utility
report (perceived-quality ^ p-quality) * ((1 / price) ^ (1 - p-quality))
end
to-report middlew-utility
report (perceived-quality ^ m-quality) * ((1 / price) ^ (1 - m-quality))
end
to-report richw-utility
report (perceived-quality ^ r-quality) * ((1 / price) ^ (1 - r-quality))
end
;;LORENZ CURVE;;
to update-lorenz-and-gini
let sorted-wealths sort [wealth] of consumers
let total-wealth sum sorted-wealths
let wealth-sum-so-far 0
100
let index 0
set gini-index-reserve 0
set lorenz-points []
repeat newcomers [
set wealth-sum-so-far (wealth-sum-so-far + item index sorted-wealths)
set lorenz-points lput ((wealth-sum-so-far / total-wealth) * 100) lorenz-points
set index (index + 1)
set gini-index-reserve
gini-index-reserve +
(index / newcomers) -
(wealth-sum-so-far / total-wealth)
]
end
to-report lognormal-gini
report (gini-index-reserve / count consumers) / 0.5
end
;; By Einloft, P. ; Pereima, J. B. ;;
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